University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine
W. Nicholson Price II

University of Michigan Law School, wnp@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2277

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Price, W. Nicholson, II. "Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine." Cardozo Law Review 37, no. 4
(2016): 1401-53.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

PRICE.37.4.6 (Do Not Delete)

4/3/2016 1:49 PM

BIG DATA, PATENTS, AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE
W. Nicholson Price II †

Big data has tremendous potential to improve health care. Unfortunately,
intellectual property law isn’t ready to support that leap. In the next wave of datadriven medicine, black-box medicine, researchers use sophisticated algorithms to
examine huge troves of health data, finding complex, implicit relationships and
making individualized assessments for patients. Black-box medicine offers potentially
immense benefits, but also requires substantial high investment. Firms must develop
new datasets, models, and validations, which are all nonrivalrous information goods
with significant spillovers, requiring incentives for welfare-optimizing investment.
Current intellectual property law fails to provide adequate incentives for blackbox medicine. The Supreme Court has sharply restricted patentable subject matter in
the recent Prometheus, Myriad, and Alice cases, and what might still be patentable
is limited by the statutory requirements of written description and enablement. Other
incentives for investment, such as trade secrecy or prizes, fail to fill the gaps. These
limits push firms away from using big data in medicine to solve big problems, and
push firms toward small-scale incremental innovation. Small tweaks to doctrine will
help, but are not enough. Instead, the big data needed to support transformative
medical innovation should be considered as infrastructure for innovation and should
be the focus of substantial public effort.

† Assistant Professor, University of New Hampshire School of Law. J.D., Columbia
University School of Law, 2011; Ph.D. (Biological Sciences), Columbia University Graduate
School of Arts and Sciences, 2010. I wish to thank Ana Bračič, Glenn Cohen, Rebecca
Eisenberg, Roger Ford, Matt Lawrence, Michael Madison, Peter Menell, Kevin Outterson,
Geertrui Van Overwalle, Ben Roin, Rachel Sachs, Jake Sherkow, and Jeff Skopek for their
helpful comments and feedback. Cassandra Simmons and Abhishek Shukla-Bannerjee provided
excellent research assistance. This work benefited from feedback at the Health Law Professors’
Conference, the Munich Conference on Innovation and Competition, the Intellectual Property
Scholars’ Conference, the Michigan State Junior Intellectual Property Scholars’ Workshop, the
University of Tulsa Faculty Colloquium, the Suffolk IP Roundtable, and the Boston University
Workshop on Personalized Medicine and Incentives. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Medicine is both expensive and imprecise. Although doctors have
an increasingly expansive toolkit of treatment options, knowing which
drug to give to which patient—and how much and when—requires
substantial knowledge about differences between patients and the
biological networks that underlie treatments. Personalized medicine
tries to clear the fog, determining the characteristics of each patient and
her disease and recommending the most appropriate treatment. 1
Personalized medicine has been a scientific and policy goal for years, but
has recently received renewed policy focus. 2 In President Obama’s 2015
State of the Union Address, he announced the Precision Medicine
Initiative, 3 aimed at driving research and development of personalized
medicine. 4
The dominant examples of personalized medicine so far are
relationships that are well-understood and validated in clinical trials:
For instance, using a single genetic test to find whether a patient’s
cancer is likely to respond to a drug developed alongside that test, and
treating the patient accordingly. 5 But simple one-to-one relationships
are only a relatively small part of biomedical complexity, 6 and it is much
harder to fully understand and clinically validate more complex
relationships. 7 Diseases and treatments are frequently dependent on
combinations of multiple genetic variables with environmental factors
See infra text accompanying notes 32–40.
See, e.g., Wylie Burke & Bruce M. Psaty, Personalized Medicine in the Era of Genomics,
298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1682 (2007); Isaac S. Chan & Geoffrey S. Ginsburg, Personalized
Medicine: Progress and Promise, 12 GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS, 2011, at 217; Geoffrey S.
Ginsburg & Jeanette J. McCarthy, Personalized Medicine: Revolutionizing Drug Discovery and
Patient Care, 19 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 491 (2001); Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S.
Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301 (2010); Pauline C. Ng et
al., An Agenda for Personalized Medicine, 461 NATURE 724 (2009).
3 President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 20, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015).
4 See Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372
NEW ENG. J. MED. 793, 793 (2015). For the purposes of this Article, “personalized medicine”
and “precision medicine” are used synonymously. The Precision Medicine Initiative is
discussed in greater detail below. See infra notes 185–90.
5 See Walter P. Carney, HER2/neu Status Is an Important Biomarker in Guiding
Personalized HER2/neu Therapy, 9 CONNECTION 25 (2006) (discussing the use of the drug
Herceptin to treat breast cancer after clinical trials confirmed that Herceptin was effective only
when the tumor overexpresses the gene for a particular receptor that the drug targets).
6 See Soumita Podder & Tapash C. Ghosh, Exploring the Differences in Evolutionary Rates
Between Monogenic and Polygenic Disease Genes in Human, 27 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
EVOLUTION 934, 934 (2010) (noting that simple one-gene genetic disorders are much less
common than multifactorial genetic diseases).
7 W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 441 (2015)
[hereinafter Price, Black-Box Medicine].
1
2
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and other physical variables, like weight, blood pressure, and sex. To
find these dependencies and relationships, personalized medicine
cannot rely on figuring out everything explicitly and confirming via
clinical trials. 8 Instead, scientists can use sophisticated computer
algorithms to analyze large datasets of health information, seeking
patterns, predictions, and recommendations. This is black-box
medicine. 9
Black-box medicine is “black-box” precisely because the
relationships at its heart are opaque—not because their developers
deliberately hide them, but because either they are too complex to
understand, or they are the product of non-transparent algorithms that
never tell the scientists, “this is what we found.” 10 Opacity is not
desirable, but is rather a necessary byproduct of the development
process. 11
Black-box medicine lets scientists tap a wider range of biological
relationships, and carries correspondingly broad benefits for health care.
Matching patients to diseases and treatments more precisely could
improve the quality of treatment, reduce the incidence of unnecessary
side effects, and potentially save billions in wasted or inappropriate
medical care. 12 It also suggests the possibility of new treatments,
whether by suggesting new possibilities for drug exploration or by
repurposing already-approved drugs for new or more targeted uses. 13
Rather than health care decisions being driven only by a relatively small
set of carefully controlled clinical trials conducted on broad categories,
decisions could be informed by the ongoing and collective medical
experience of hundreds of millions of other patients. Black-box

8 See P.M. Rothwell, Can Overall Results of Clinical Trials Be Applied to All Patients?, 345
LANCET 1616 (1995).
9 See discussion infra Section I.A.
10 Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 433–34.
11 Id. at 434. This process-based opacity contrasts with situations where those developing
information and algorithms deliberately keep them secret, whether for competitive advantage,
to avoid public or government scrutiny, or for other reasons. For a description of the problems
with deliberate secrecy and obscurity, see generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
12 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., PRIORITIES FOR PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE 1 (2008), https://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/PCAST/pcast_report_
v2.pdf.
13 Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS
(forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses] (“The vast majority of
drug compounds operate by targeting biological pathways that may affect the progress or
symptoms of a range of diseases, and almost all drugs have ‘off-target’ activity on other
biological pathways that may affect a different set of diseases. Consequently, it is common that
a drug designed to treat one disease will have potential new indications for treating one or more
entirely different conditions.” (footnotes omitted)).
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medicine promises to radically expand the reach of personalized
medicine, with tremendous potential gains. 14
The question, then, is how to get there, and the path is not
straightforward. Costs and hurdles exist at each phase of black-box
medicine’s development. 15 First, information must be gathered and
vetted, which requires financial resources and navigating legal
requirements, including privacy and informed consent. 16 Second,
developing reliable and sensitive algorithms demands dedicated efforts
by sophisticated programmers. 17 The experience of other predictive
algorithms demonstrates this; for example, the movie-rental service
Netflix created a three-year, multi-million dollar prize effort to improve
its simple movie-prediction algorithm, in which thousands of teams
managed to improve the algorithm’s performance by only ten percent. 18
Third, since complex implicit predictions are much less amenable to the
forms of validation on which we traditionally rely—scientific
understanding, clinical trials, and postmarket surveillance—other forms
of validation must be developed by the innovating firm, regulators, or
third parties—or some combination of the three. 19
Overcoming these hurdles will require significant incentives, and
pure market incentives are likely to be woefully insufficient. Black-box
medicine follows the classic pattern justifying intellectual property, in
which firms underinvest in non-excludable information goods because
they cannot capture the full social value of those goods. 20 Black-box
medicine relies principally on pure information goods: collected data,
patterns discovered within that data, and validation of those patterns.21
Intellectual property protection theoretically allows firms to exclude
others from the information good and therefore appropriate a higher
portion—though not all—of the surplus, increasing innovation closer to
optimal levels.

See discussion infra Section I.A.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
16 See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
17 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
18 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 439 (describing the process of Netflix
updating its movie recommendation algorithm); The Netflix Prize Rules, NETFLIX, http://
www.netflixprize.com/rules (last visited May 9, 2015); Prizemaster, NETFLIX PRIZE (Sept. 18,
2009 4:58 PM), http://www.netflixprize.com/community/viewtopic.php?id=1537 (announcing
the winner and noting a 10.06% improvement in performance).
19 See discussion infra Section I.B.3.
20 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 619 (1962) (“To sum up, we expect a free enterprise economy to underinvest in
invention and research (as compared with an ideal) because it is risky, because the product can
be appropriated only to a limited extent, and because of increasing returns in use.”).
21 See discussion infra Section I.A.
14
15
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The current intellectual property regime not only provides
inadequate incentives for black-box medicine, but the incentives it
provides also push the field in counterproductive directions. Patents
provide the primary intellectual property incentives for technological
innovation, and although patents are imperfect at driving algorithm
development, they still create significant incentives. 22 Until quite
recently, method patents were broadly available for diagnostic
algorithms, as long as they satisfied the Federal Circuit’s requirement
that the invention involve a machine or a transformation of matter—
which could be satisfied by as little as performing a blood test. 23 But in
2012, the Supreme Court held in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories that a patent covering a standard diagnostic
method—administering a drug, measuring the level of a metabolite, and
knowing based on the result whether to increase or decrease the drug’s
dosage—was unpatentable, as essentially claiming, and thus preempting,
a law of nature. 24 Close on the heels of Prometheus, the Court decided
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics in 2013, holding
that isolated genomic DNA is unpatentable as a natural phenomenon; 25
such DNA patents, while not essential to diagnostic testing methods,
provided secondary protection to those methods involving genetic
testing. 26 Finally, in 2014, the Court in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International strengthened Prometheus by holding that abstract
inventions, such as an algorithm, were not made patentable merely by
implementing them on a computer. 27
See infra Section II.A.
When the Federal Circuit first addressed the Prometheus case, it held that testing blood
for the presence of metabolites was a “transformation” sufficient to make the invention
patentable. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2009), vacated, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010). In the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the
Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation test” went from a dispositive test to an
“important and useful clue” as to whether the invention covers patentable subject matter. Bilski
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602–04 (2010). However, the importance of this clue to the Federal
Circuit was such that it remained practically dispositive. See Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012)
(holding, on remand after Bilski, that “as applied to the present claims, the ‘useful and
important clue, an investigative tool,’ leads to a clear and compelling conclusion, viz., that the
present claims pass muster under § 101” (quoting Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604)).
24 Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
25 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
26 If a firm cannot fully protect diagnostic methods or algorithms that involve a piece of
genetic information, patents on the isolated gene of interest can still prevent others from
determining the gene variant and therefore from practicing the method. Myriad Genetics used
this strategy to protect its breast cancer diagnostic tests. Id. at 2113. This strategy is imperfect;
indeed, whole-genome sequencing likely circumvents isolated gene patents, see W. Nicholson
Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole Genome Sequencing and
Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601 (2012), but blocked many market entrants in
Myriad’s case.
27 See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
22
23
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After Prometheus, Myriad, and Alice, incentives for developing
personalized medicine—especially the complex algorithms at the heart
of black-box medicine—are much lower than they were before.28
Perhaps more importantly, the remaining incentives available now push
personalized medicine in the wrong direction. Because patents are on
stronger ground when they cover inventions that closely link devices or
treatments to a new correlation or algorithm, firms are likely to
prioritize development of those combination products rather than
pursuing broader analyses of large datasets and complex correlations
within them. This pushes firms toward maintaining the current model
of simple, explicit relationships, rather than developing and exploiting
the far larger realm of complex and often implicit relationships.
In addition, firms may increasingly turn away from the patent
system and rely instead on trade secrecy law and practices to protect
proprietary data and algorithms. 29 Secrecy is problematic for medicine
in general, but especially for black-box medicine. Because black-box
medicine already involves complex and frequently implicit
relationships, as much transparency as possible is needed for validation
and oversight. In addition, cumulative innovation based on shared data
and algorithms is crucial to advancing the field, but is restrained by
pervasive secrecy.
So how can we smooth the path for black-box medicine? The first
reaction to inadequate innovation incentives is often to throw more
intellectual property protection at the issue to drive it forward, but this
Article argues that this approach is insufficiently nuanced here, and that
it raises new problems. Developing black-box medicine involves solving
multiple interconnected problems: generating and consolidating the
necessary data, developing algorithms and models, and validating those
models for medical use. 30 Each of those processes requires individual
consideration through the lens of innovation policy; while algorithms
follow familiar innovation patterns, databases—especially large, broad
databases aimed at driving future innovation—are more similar to
infrastructure than to inventions, and therefore need to be the subject of
substantial public efforts to develop them. Validation of algorithms
requires yet another set of incentives, potentially in the form of a

28 This is not to say that no incentives exist—first mover advantages, trade secrecy, and
whatever patents are available provide some incentives. Nor is to argue that black-box medicine
is not being developed at all—some firms are active in the space—but rather that available
incentives are smaller than optimal and that black-box medicine is being developed less and
more slowly than would be preferable.
29 See Barbara J. Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, 42 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 51 (2014) [hereinafter Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing].
30 See discussion infra Section I.A.
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“validation bounty” to encourage third parties to evaluate black-box
medicine.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly describes blackbox medicine, discusses the hurdles to its development, and discusses
the need for policy incentives. Part II addresses the patent incentives
available for personalized medicine and the diagnostic tests and
algorithms on which it relies. Part III addresses non-patent incentives.
Part IV discusses potential solutions and policy interventions. A few
brief thoughts conclude.
I. BLACK-BOX MEDICINE, HURDLES, AND THE NEED FOR INCENTIVES
Black-box medicine requires substantial investment to pursue. This
Part describes black-box medicine in more detail, then lists the three
main types of practical developmental hurdles—data, algorithms, and
validation—and concludes by offering the case for providing economic
incentives to drive development forward.
A.

Black-Box Medicine

Medical science has long relied on clinical trials to demonstrate the
efficacy of interventions, whether pharmaceutical, surgical, or devicebased. 31 Increasingly, however, doctors, patients, scientists, and policymakers are recognizing that because patients are different from one
another, medical interventions should frequently be tailored to the
specific characteristics of each individual patient; recent years have seen
an increased focus on personalized medicine, which relies on this
tailoring to provide “the right drug for the right patient at the right dose
and time.” 32 In his 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama
announced the Precision Medicine Initiative, 33 a $215 million multiyear
initiative to accelerate the development of personalized medicine. 34
In the early stages of personalized medicine, development has
relied on well-validated, explicit, and—as a result—relatively simple
links between a particular patient characteristic and the resulting

See generally Rothwell, supra note 8.
Wolfgang Sadée & Zunyan Dai, Pharmacogenetics/Genomics and Personalized Medicine,
14 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS (SUPPLEMENT 2) R207, R207 (2005).
33 Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, supra note 3.
34 Collins & Varmus, supra note 4; Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President
Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative.
31
32
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intervention. 35 The poster child of personalized medicine is the use of
the drug Herceptin to treat breast cancer. Clinical trials confirm that
Herceptin is effective only when the tumor overexpresses the gene for a
particular receptor that the drug targets. 36 Women who are considering
taking Herceptin can use a test to evaluate their tumor’s expression level
to make the right treatment decision. 37 Current personalized medicine
mostly follows this model: well-understood scientific links between
patient characteristics and interventions are validated through clinical
trials and then adopted into medical practice. 38
Unfortunately, this mode of development comes with substantial
limitations. Our ability to map biological relationships explicitly is
limited, and as a consequence we have more trouble elucidating the
complex biological networks that underlay much of human disease. 39
Even more limited is the tool of clinical trials. More complex
relationships split people into more precisely defined categories—that is,
after all, the end goal of personalized medicine—but that means that
fewer people exist in each category, and that those people are harder to
find. 40 Such splitting fits poorly with the clinical trial model of
aggregating larger numbers of roughly comparable individuals and
grouping them into a small number of sets to measure the difference at
issue. For validating complex biological relationships, even assuming
they can be identified by the underlying science, clinical trials pose
major challenges.
Black-box medicine seeks to address these challenges by leveraging
the availability of large amounts of health data and the increasing
sophistication of machine-learning algorithms. 41 Health data are
constantly expanding, including genetic sequences, metabolic screens,
and the increasing amount of health information included in electronic
health records. 42 Sophisticated algorithms can find patterns in these
See, e.g., Carney, supra note 5.
Id. at 25–27.
37 See John C. Mansour & Roderich E. Schwarz, Molecular Mechanisms for Individualized
Cancer Care, 207 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 250, 250–58 (2008).
38 See generally Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 427–29.
39 See, e.g., Revathi Rajkumar & Ferhaan Ahmad, The Genomic Complexity Underlying
Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension: From Mendel to Networks, 189 AM. J. RESPIRATORY &
CRITICAL CARE MED. 1152 (2014) (describing complex interactions of genetic and
environmental factors); Takanori Watanabe et al., Disease Prediction Based on Functional
Connectomes Using a Scalable and Spatially-Informed Support Vector Machine, NEUROIMAGE,
Aug. 1, 2014, at 183 (using machine-learning techniques to analyze six-dimensional spatial
mappings of neuronal connections in the brain to predict schizophrenia).
40 Ultimately, the goal is to base medical decisions on the full picture of each unique
individual; in a real sense, then, the eventual number of precisely relevant individuals should
converge to one.
41 See generally Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7.
42 See id. at 430–31.
35
36
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data, whether those patterns reflect which patients are likely to benefit
most from a limited resource like an inpatient hospital bed, 43 what
pattern of 5000 genes predicts how a lung tumor will respond to
treatment, 44 or the possibility that a patient with an unremarkable
collection of characteristics is actually at very high risk for a rare
disease. 45
While machine-learning algorithms can pull useful relationships
out of large datasets, the challenge is that such relationships are
frequently opaque. 46 Sometimes, the relationships will be formally
opaque—that is, in some machine learning techniques, it is actually
impossible to state how the algorithm classifies observations once it has
been developed. 47 Other times, the relationships will only be practically
opaque—that is, they may be so complicated that they defy explicit
understanding, like a relationship between fifty genes, several
environmental factors, and a health outcome. 48 In either case, the
opacity of the relationships makes them hard to impossible to validate
by the traditional methods of scientific understanding and clinical
trials. 49
In sum, black-box medicine is the use of non-transparent
computer algorithms to make health-care decisions. 50 It has tremendous
43 See I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns that Arise from Using Complex
Predictive Analytics in Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139, 1140 (2014).
44 Hojin Moon et al., Ensemble Methods for Classification of Patients for Personalized
Medicine with High-Dimensional Data, 41 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MED. 197 (2007).
45 Joseph A. Cruz & David S. Wishart, Applications of Machine Learning in Cancer
Prediction and Prognosis, 2 CANCER INFORMATICS 59 (2007).
46 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 432–34.
47 See id. at 433–34.
48 See id. at 434.
49 See id. at 440–41.
50 More precisely, there are two different types of algorithms involved in black-box
medicine. The first is the machine-learning algorithm itself, which identifies patterns; the
second is a prediction/recommendation algorithm incorporating insights from the first. These
two may be unified or separated. To take a simple example from explicit personalized medicine,
consider the case of the cancer drug Herceptin and expression levels of the receptor gene
HER2/neu, mentioned above. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. Only tumors
overexpressing HER2/neu are responsive to Herceptin treatment. See supra notes 36–37 and
accompanying text. Assuming the relationship was unknown, one could conceive of a search
algorithm designed to find the relationship. Such an algorithm could examine a dataset
containing expression levels for many genes and tumor responsiveness to Herceptin,
calculating correlations between each gene’s expression level and responsiveness, returning the
strongest correlation—presumably HER2/neu. See, e.g., Erdal Cosgun et al., High-Dimensional
Pharmacogenetic Prediction of a Continuous Trait Using Machine Learning Techniques with
Application to Warfarin Dose Prediction in African Americans, 27 BIOINFORMATICS 1384,
1385–86 (2011) (describing algorithms deployed to find alleles related to warfarin dosing in an
African-American cohort). That search would then yield a separate, much simpler treatmentrecommendation algorithm: measure the expression level of HER2/neu, and if that level is
above a certain threshold, treat with Herceptin; otherwise, pursue a different strategy. See, e.g.,
id. at 1386–87 (discussing performance of resulting models recommending warfarin dosage). In
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potential for health care, and raises possibilities for substantial savings
both in development (as compared to traditional medical development
pathways) and in application (since a closer match between patient and
treatment can avoid costly errors and wasted treatment). However,
black-box medicine still requires substantial resources to develop.
B.

Hurdles to Development

Black-box medicine promises the possibility of identifying new
treatments and targeting those treatments for substantially lower costs,
in time and money, than the current explicit pathway for developing
personalized medicine. Nevertheless, black-box medicine still faces
substantial practical hurdles in development. 51 This Section addresses
three key hurdles. First, black-box medicine requires the assembly of
large, high-quality datasets of health information. Second, algorithms
themselves must be developed, which requires substantial expertise.
Third and finally, predictive relationships must be validated to assure
safe and effective use in medical practice.
1.

Datasets

The first, and likely most expensive, requirement for black-box
medicine is the generation of large, high-quality datasets of health
information. A key advantage of black-box medicine is that the expense
of data creation is not required, because black-box medicine relies
principally on sophisticated retrospective analyses. Thus, the
extraordinarily expensive process of clinical trials is not necessary.
However, the effective use of existing and contemporaneously generated
data requires surmounting at least two practical challenges: acquiring
other, more complex or opaque situations, the search and prediction algorithms would be the
same; for instance, a neural network trained on a set of data to perform complex classification
tasks is both the search algorithm (as it is being trained) and the prediction algorithm (once
trained, and in use thereafter). See, e.g., Francesco Ciompi et al., Automatic Classification of
Pulmonary Peri-Fissural Nodules in Computed Tomography Using an Ensemble of 2D Views and
a Convolutional Neural Network out-of-the-Box, MED. IMAGE ANALYSIS, Dec. 2015, at 195
(describing neural networks trained and used in lung cancer screening). For ease of
explanation, these two algorithmic functions are elided through the remainder of this Article.
51 Black-box medicine also faces substantial policy and legal questions, including how it will
be regulated, how it will be reimbursed, and how privacy and informed consent concerns will
be adequately addressed. These policy questions are outside the scope of this article, though
they are noted and briefly described in Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 442–66. To
the extent that uncertainty about policy questions decreases the expected benefits to a firm of
developing a particular black-box implementation, those concerns reduce innovation incentives
as well.
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and linking data from different sources, and ensuring the quality of the
final dataset.
a. Data Collection
First, firms must gain access to the substantial amounts of data in
electronic form. As electronic medical records become more prevalent,
collecting data should become practically easier because data must only
be collected and translated, not moved from paper records into
electronic form. However, paper records will remain significant for the
development of black-box medicine, as they are necessary to provide
legacy data and information to elucidate longer-term patterns. 52 Other
data are new in kind; as broad screening tests, such as whole-genome
sequencing or metabolic screens, move into more widespread practice,
the data available to be gathered will likewise increase. 53
Concerns regarding economics and patient-consent are potentially
more challenging. Health data are valuable; health care systems know it,
and health care providers and patients sometimes do as well. 54 Getting
information will often require compensating whoever has gathered the
information in the first place—done the testing, compiled the records,
or conducted the screening—or the patient whose data is being
gathered, or both. In either case, consent from patients will generally be
required, either at the initial data collection (which may or may not have
already happened) or at the transfer of data. 55
There is a large exception to the consent requirement: in many
situations, the most straightforward way to acquire individual-level
patient data is to anonymize that information. 56 However,
anonymization runs into two interrelated problems. First,
52 See Diane Dolezel & Jackie Moczygemba, Implementing EHRs: An Exploratory Study to
Examine Current Practices in Migrating Physician Practice, PERSP. HEALTH INFO. MGMT.,
Winter 2015, at 2–3, 13; Roy Schoenberg & Charles Safran, Internet Based Repository of Medical
Records that Retains Patient Confidentiality, 321 BMJ 1199, 1199 (2000).
53 See Antonio Regalado, EmTech: Illumina Says 228,000 Human Genomes Will Be
Sequenced this Year, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/
531091/emtech-illumina-says-228000-human-genomes-will-be-sequenced-this-year.
54 See Barbara J. Evans, Sustainable Access to Data for Postmarketing Medical Product Safety
Surveillance Under the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 11 (2014)
[hereinafter Evans, Sustainable Access to Data]; Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Data: Property,
Privacy & the Public Interest, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 586 (2010).
55 Consent is required under the Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2015), of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C.).
56 Anonymization is enough to remove the requirement of patient consent for data use
under HIPAA. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a). For a discussion of the substantial differences
between anonymity and privacy, see Jeffrey M. Skopek, Anonymity, the Production of Goods,
and Institutional Design, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751 (2014).
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anonymization is imperfect; even if patient-identifying information is
removed from a medical record, the remaining information can be used
to re-identify the individual. 57 Second, anonymization complicates the
task of assembling data about one patient into integrated records. If data
from one source about a particular individual cannot be matched with
data from another source about that same individual, substantial
information is lost. Similarly, if information from a patient at one point
in time cannot be supplemented with later information, risks and
benefits are much harder to evaluate and leverage. While technological
solutions are feasible, 58 they create an added layer of complexity, and the
more robust the mechanism for ensuring that all of an individual’s data
can in fact be collected in a single record, the greater the chance of reidentification for that individual, both based on the collation
mechanism and on the collected health data themselves. 59
Individual corporations have gathered significant amounts of
patients’ health data; however, those data are typically jealously guarded
and unavailable for others to use in developing medical models. 60 As
57 See, e.g., Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (Not) to Protect Genomic Data Privacy
in a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-Identification to Evaluate and Design Anonymity
Protection Systems, 37 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 179 (2004); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010);
Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117 (2013); Jane
Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011). Note that reidentification is a practical and ethical concern more than a legal one, as current regimes
typically do not acknowledge the possibility. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.514(a)–(b)(2). Access to at
least some currently anonymous datasets requires an agreement that the requester will not
attempt to re-identify the individuals whose data is being shared. See, e.g., Data Use
Restrictions, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://wonder.cdc.gov/
DataUse.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2015) (“The CDC/ATSDR Policy on Releasing and Sharing
Data prohibits linking these data with other data sets or information for the purpose of
identifying an individual.”).
58 Vanderbilt’s eMerge Network follows this model. See About, EMERGE NETWORK, https://
emerge.mc.vanderbilt.edu/about-emerge (last visited Dec. 22, 2015); see also Kristin Madison,
Health Regulators as Data Stewards, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1605, 1616 (2014) (“Participants in the
network agree to submit genetic data to a coordinating center that will then combine the data
with the network dataset and submit them to the database of Genotypes and Phenotypes, which
makes individual-level genetic data available to researchers.”).
59 For instance, if the collation mechanism allows those adding data into a database to
access the identity of the data record and the data being added in order to ensure that the
record is entirely about the same person, that would be a collation mechanism that could
breach anonymity. On the other hand, if the result of a perfectly anonymous collation
mechanism is a dataset that contains very large amounts of health data for each referenced
individual, that amount of data helps enable re-identification efforts. For an overview of reidentification challenges, see Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010).
60 See, e.g., Press Release, 23andMe, 23andMe Announces Collaboration with Pfizer Inc. to
Conduct Genetic Research Through 23andMe’s Research Platform (Jan. 12, 2015), http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/23andme-announces-collaboration-with-pfizer-inc-toconduct-genetic-research-through-23andmes-research-platform-300018683.html (announcing
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described earlier, black-box medicine relies on identifying complex
patterns in health datasets. Its strength, both in finding relationships
and in verifying that those relationships are real, depends on having
large datasets with varied patients. Keeping data separate in corporate
data silos, particularly silos created for particular medical or economic
purposes, 61 enervates the broader power of black-box medicine.
b. Data Quality
The second major challenge is ensuring the quality of the collected
data. Because black-box medicine relies on data-based development and
validation, and lacks the potential for specific scientific or clinical
validation, data quality is especially important. Errors in data can lead to
false pattern recognition, although theoretically, only biased data should
create such problems. Data that are afflicted by random error make
patterns harder to recognize, however, decreasing the number of
relationships that can be discovered and used and requiring larger
datasets to observe the same patterns.
As others have noted, problems in data quality can arise in multiple
ways. 62 Front-line coders—that is, the doctor entering data in her office
or the technician reporting lab results—can introduce simple human
error when inputting data into electronic systems. 63 Entering data from
paper records creates another opportunity for human error. 64
In addition to random error, data quality problems can arise due to
systemic incentives inherent in the data collection environment. Much
biomedical data is collected in and for insurance records. Doctors have
incentives to “upcode” treatments to receive higher reimbursement;
even in situations that fall short of fraud, ambiguous situations are more
likely to be coded as the more expensive alternative. 65 Setting aside
a collaboration allowing Pfizer to research lupus using 23andMe’s “largest dataset of its kind,”
including over 800,000 individuals’ genotyped samples).
61 Myriad Genetics, for instance, developed a business strategy focused on being the
exclusive provider of tests for the BRCA1/2 breast-cancer-predisposition genes. Myriad has a
strong interest in keeping other researchers from using its data, and has no incentive to
integrate its data into broader health prediction pictures so long as those analyses are
conducted or controlled by others. Accordingly, Myriad’s extensive data on BRCA1/2 variants
and their significance are generally unavailable to others developing predictive algorithms,
along with the health data collected on the women who provided the data and, in many cases,
their relatives. See Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 233, at 240–54 (2015).
62 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of Biomedical Data: Is
Bigger Really Better?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 515–21 (2013).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Christopher S. Brunt, CPT Fee Differentials and Visit Upcoding Under Medicare Part B,
20 HEALTH ECON. 831 (2011). This incentive largely relies on the dominant fee-for-service
model, and is likely to be decreased or eliminated in capitated payment plans, where the health
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biased incentives, the purpose of insurance data collection—ensuring
that appropriate payments are made—means that more emphasis is put
on cost-related aspects of treatment, and medically relevant differences
may be elided. 66
Ensuring the greatest possible quality for black-box medicine
datasets requires combating these sources of error and bias. To the
extent that redundant data can be gathered—for instance, both
insurance reimbursement records and electronic health records—those
redundant sources can be compared to identify potential coding
mistakes. In the process of physically coding information from paper
records to electronic datasets, multiple coders can be used and
intercoder reliability used as a check on quality.
Overall, assembling the data needed to develop black-box medicine
may present the largest cost hurdle to its development. It requires
coordination among multiple data sources, checks on quality, and—
though not discussed in detail here—compliance with legal and
regulatory requirements. 67 These expenses are likely much less than the
tremendous costs associated with generating gold-standard clinical trial
data, but are nonetheless significant. Good data are the foundation of
black-box medicine, and require investment accordingly.
2.

Algorithm Development

The second major cost hurdle for black-box medicine is its heart:
the development of algorithms to find patterns in the data and then to
predict medical outcomes and recommend treatment. Predictive
algorithms are increasingly sophisticated—indeed, that sophistication
enables the possibility of black-box medicine in the first place—but their
development continues to require substantial time, programming
care provider is compensated per patient or per episode of care rather than by procedure. James
C. Robinson, Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment Incentives, 79 MILBANK
Q. 149, 158 (2001).
66 See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 62, at 519.
67 Research must comply with HIPAA, especially its Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162,
164; the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, which governs human subjects research funded by any
of several government agencies; FDA human subjects research rules, if intended to support
drug approval, 21 C.F.R. pt. 50; and various other regulatory requirements. See, e.g., KRISTEN
ROSATI ET AL., MINI-SENTINEL PRIVACY PANEL, HIPAA AND COMMON RULE COMPLIANCE IN
THE MINI-SENTINEL PILOT (2011), http://mini-sentinel.org/work_products/About_Us/
HIPAA%20and%20Common%20Rule%20Compliance%20in%20the%20Mini-Sentinel%
20Pilot.pdf (describing HIPAA and Common Rule requirements for FDA’s Mini-Sentinel pilot
project to monitor adverse drug reactions); Evans, Sustainable Access to Data, supra note 54
(discussing policy issues with FDA’s Sentinel project); Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7,
at 454–57 (describing privacy concerns in black-box medicine). A full accounting of these
requirements is outside the scope of this Article.
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experience, and computational resources. Even simple predictive
algorithms, such as movie recommendations for the video-on-demand
service Netflix, require major effort to develop and optimize. 68 Relatively
small and simple datasets can still run into constraints in terms of
computer processing power, 69 and expert programmers are generally
required to develop the most appropriate algorithms. In other, more
complex fields where predictive algorithms are deployed, such as
finance or creditworthiness, even more significant investments are
required for algorithmic development. 70
3.

Validation

The third and final cost hurdle for black-box medicine is the
requirement for validation to ensure high quality. Black-box medicine
lacks the validation of scientific understanding and clinical trials, and
thus requires other approaches. Ensuring that black-box algorithms are
as well validated as possible based on available data is crucial to
improving health-care quality, as well as to promoting provider and
patient acceptance. 71
Algorithms developed exclusively through discerning patterns in
complex health data lack the two typical forms of validation used in
current models of personalized medicine: scientific understanding and
targeted clinical trials. 72 Although some current medical treatments are
developed and applied without an understanding of mechanism, 73 in
most instances we understand approximately how and why the
treatment works. This scientific understanding provides a base-level
validation of a treatment option; if we can say that a particular
68 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 439 (describing the process of Netflix
updating its movie recommendation algorithm).
69 See ANDREAS TÖSCHER, MICHAEL JAHRER & ROBERT M. BELL, THE BIGCHAOS SOLUTION
TO THE NETFLIX GRAND PRIZE 3, 9, 15, 17 (2009), http://www.netflixprize.com/assets/
GrandPrize2009_BPC_BigChaos.pdf (noting that some algorithms could only be run a limited
number of times due to memory, storage, and processing power limitations).
70 PASQUALE, supra note 11.
71 Validation is a challenge from both innovation and regulation points of view, since it
impacts both technological development and the assurance of high quality for public use. These
two goals are intertwined; the creation of information about new medical technologies is itself a
form of innovation. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in
Innovation Policy].
72 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 440–42.
73 For instance, aspirin had an unknown mechanism of action for decades, and lithium’s
mechanism is still not well understood. See Gin S. Malhi et al., Potential Mechanisms of Action
of Lithium in Bipolar Disorder, 27 CNS DRUGS 135, 136 (2013); J. R. Vane, Inhibition of
Prostaglandin Synthesis as a Mechanism of Action for Aspirin-like Drugs, 231 NATURE NEW
BIOLOGY 232 (1971).
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monoclonal antibody treats rheumatoid arthritis because it targets a
protein receptor that triggers the inflammatory response, that
understanding provides validation that the treatment is at least
potentially legitimate and effective. 74 When the relationships are too
complex to understand, or are literally opaque, scientific understanding
is a priori unavailable as a potential source of validation.
The second typical form of validation, required for FDA approval
for most treatment options or diagnostic tests, comes in the form of
targeted clinical trials. Different sets of patients receive the specific
treatment, and if the treated set of patients showed statistically
significant improvements over the control set, the clinical trial validates
the treatment. Black-box medicine algorithms are largely not amenable
to clinical trials because the underlying relationships are either
unknown or too complex to collect sufficiently large patient samples.
This is especially true of more holistic algorithms that incorporate
multiple relationships into more general predictions and
recommendations.
In the development and validation of black-box medicine, large
unbiased samples can partially substitute for the methodological
strength of randomized clinical trials, but some form of validation is still
required to ensure the strength, accuracy, and quality of the resulting
algorithm. Because the traditional forms of validation are unavailable,
black-box medicine should rely instead on efforts by external parties to
computationally support the original algorithm, both by evaluating the
development parameters (i.e., how the algorithm was developed) and by
trying to independently reach similar results through parallel
computational methods—ideally on parallel data. 75 This validation
effort, which is closely tied to regulation for quality, is nonetheless a
form of costly innovation, and a hurdle that black-box medicine will
need to overcome.
Overall, the costs and hurdles associated with developing black-box
medicine are significant and require major investment from relevant
stakeholders. This does not in itself justify policy intervention to
increase incentives; in many situations, the market is expected to reward
the need for large investment, so that no particular policy action need be
taken. The next Section briefly makes the case that additional incentives
are required for black-box medicine’s development.

74 Nancy J. Olsen & C. Michael Stein, New Drugs for Rheumatoid Arthritis, 350 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2167, 2170–75 (2004).
75 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at Section II.C.
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The Need for Incentives

The basic justification for intellectual property is a well-told story. 76
Society derives tremendous benefits from innovation, but absent
intellectual property, ideas are frequently expensive to produce but hard
to protect. 77 In addition to the initial discovery, the process of taking an
idea through the development into a commercial product can be costly
and is frequently subject to free-riding. 78 Since firms cannot capture
much of the value of their investments in innovation, they invest at a
socially suboptimal level. 79 Intellectual property allows firms to capture
some of that surplus, increasing the incentives for invention by allowing
firms to exclude others from the invention. 80 Black-box medicine
follows this pattern closely: databases, algorithms, and the knowledge
that algorithms are reliable are all information goods, which are difficult
to keep exclusive once known. Accordingly, intellectual property—or a
substitute incentive set—is likely necessary for its socially optimal
development. 81
The patent system fills this role by guaranteeing significant
protection in exchange for disclosure of the technology, thus increasing
the type of protection available and enabling more cumulative
innovation. 82 Patents provide an alternative to either not developing an
appropriable innovation or keeping it secret. Secrecy prevents
appropriation and is bolstered by the mostly state-law doctrine of trade
76 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) [hereinafter Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for
Intellectual Property]; Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and
Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
193, 195–98 (2005); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability,
87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 507–09 (2009) [hereinafter Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability].
77 See Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, supra note 76,
at 129.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329 (1987) (describing computer software as a public good with positive network externalities
and suggesting government intellectual property interventions to encourage its development).
82 Patents also hamper cumulative innovation, if the patent on the original invention blocks
the second innovator from developing her innovation; the extent to which this occurs is
something of an open empirical question. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at
29; see also Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The
Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 838–44 (2001) (describing how
patent doctrine can facilitate cumulative innovation). However, effective trade secrecy can very
effectively prevent cumulative innovation because the mechanics of the initial innovation never
become known.
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secrecy, 83 but works poorly for innovations which can be reverseengineered or which are unavoidably public. 84 In addition, trade secrecy
limits cumulative innovation, where different innovators build on the
inventions and innovations of other firms. 85
Overall, black-box medicine is a promising branch of personalized
medicine that offers significant advances, but also requires significant
investment in nonexcludable goods. Due to its nature as a public
information good, firms are likely to invest in black-box medicine below
socially desirable levels. Accordingly, innovation incentives should be
provided at the policy level. The next Part turns to existing patent
incentives offered by the intellectual property system, and failures in
those incentives to drive the development of black-box medicine. 86
II. PATENT INCENTIVES
Patents are a key policy tool to drive technological innovation, and
are particularly important in the biomedical fields, playing a crucial role
in the development of new drugs and biologics. 87 Patents have also been
the subject of significant dispute in those fields. 88 In general, therefore,
83 For a general overview of trade secrecy law, see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade
Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 247–51 (1998).
84 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (listing
reverse engineering as a proper means of acquiring a trade secret). Trade secrecy in the context
of black-box medicine will be discussed below in Section III.C.2.
85 See Bone, supra note 83, at 266–67.
86 One important caveat is that this description of incentives applies most cleanly to welldefined, relatively stable algorithms—that is, algorithms that are developed once and then used
for some time. Black-box medicine offers the possibility of more plastic algorithms, however,
that are constantly updated as new information is received. A full analysis of the incentive
implications of such flexible second-generation algorithms is beyond the scope of this Article.
87 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 717 (2005); Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, supra note 76.
Many commentators have also criticized this view and the dominance of pharmaceutical
patents. See, e.g., Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27 (2002); Tim Hubbard & Jamie
Love, Medicines Without Barriers, NEW SCIENTIST, June 14, 2003, at 29.
88 Various policy arguments around patents have included the use of patents to extend drug
monopolies for longer terms than contemplated in the patent term, see, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill
& Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012); alleged antitrust violations when brand-name
drug companies and generic companies agree to delay generic market entry in patent litigation,
see, e.g., Lisa Allen, Note, Reviewing the Legality of Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment
Settlements: The FTC Doesn’t Get It Right, 8 GEO. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 245 (2010); Daniel A. Crane,
Per Se Illegality for Reverse Payment Patent Settlements, 61 ALA. L. REV. 575 (2010); Ronald W.
Davis, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements: A View into the Abyss, and a Modest Proposal, 21
ANTITRUST 26 (2006); the Supreme Court’s take on the issue in Federal Trade Commission v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that such settlements should be scrutinized under
antitrust’s rule of reason); and international patent protection hindering patients’ access to
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patents might appear to provide at least some incentives for the
development of algorithms central to black-box medicine, as well as
potentially data and validation. However, recent changes to patent
subject-matter eligibility law have severely limited those incentives,
leaving an incentive landscape that drives personalized medicine away
from black-box medicine. 89 In addition, persistent concerns about
black-box medicine’s ability to meet the written description and
enablement provisions of section 112 of the Patent Act make patents
more challenging to obtain even if subject-matter eligibility concerns
were to be overcome. 90
A.

Subject Matter Eligibility

The first question arising for black-box medicine is whether its key
innovations can be patented at all. Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, patents can be
granted for machines, manufactures, processes, or compositions of
matter. 91 Although these broad categories embrace “anything under the
sun that is made by man,” 92 they are not infinitely broad, and in
particular, they fail to address two of the three key technological hurdles
related to black-box medicine. Facts and data do not fall within one of
the four categories of patentable subject matter, and thus the collected
data enabling black-box medicine are unpatentable. Similarly, the result
of validation—that is, whether an algorithm works or not, and how well
it might work—is similarly outside the scope of patentable subject
matter. This leaves only the algorithms that actually drive black-box
medicine as potential subjects of patent protection. Here, however,
judicial exceptions to patentability come into play. The Supreme Court
has articulated three exceptions to patentable subject matter: abstract
ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature. 93 In a string of cases, and
especially in the 2012 case of Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court has made it
lifesaving drugs in developing nations, see, e.g., Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do
Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 1886 (2001); Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the
Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211 (2004); Sigrid Sterckx, Patents and
Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical Analysis, 4 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS
58 (2004). Patents for surgical techniques also raised a furor when they were introduced, but
have since been statutorily limited. See Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical
and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 91 (1996); see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012).
89 See discussion infra Section II.A.
90 See discussion infra Section II.B.
91 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
92 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
93 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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clear that personalized medicine algorithms will be brought within the
ambit of patentability only with great difficulty. 94
1.

Algorithms Before Mayo v. Prometheus

Prior to the Supreme Court’s Prometheus decisions in 2012,
patenting diagnostic models was much easier. 95 Although longstanding
judicial exceptions prohibited patenting of laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas, 96 firms could patent broad methods of
treatment where the novel contribution was the newly discovered
underlying biological relationship. Algorithms standing alone may be
abstract ideas, and biological correlations alone may be laws of nature,
but putting those into a broader method claim was relatively easy. 97
Thus, essentially all uses of the algorithm could be protected.
Before Prometheus, the Federal Circuit had held generally that a
broad diagnostic method was patentable so long as it was either linked
to a machine, or resulted in a transformation of matter (the “machine or
transformation” test). 98 This test was disapproved in Bilski but remained
an “important clue” to patentability 99 and generally supported the
patentability of diagnostic tests until Prometheus. Thus, patent
incentives were typically available for diagnostic algorithms. 100
All this is not to say that patents provided ideal incentives for the
algorithm development at the heart of black-box medicine. Complex
and especially implicit algorithms are more difficult to describe
sufficiently than other inventions, making it harder to satisfy section

94 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). For a
detailed description of this line of cases and its application to diagnostic tests, see Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015).
95 See Eisenberg, supra note 94.
96 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
97 Extensive case history and subsequent scholarship treats the patentability of algorithms.
See, e.g., id.; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972);
Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986) (describing
the doctrine surrounding algorithm patentability). Flook and Diehr are “difficult to reconcile,”
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms,
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 341, 343 (2013), but this Article focuses on case law that is more recent
and directly on-point.
98 See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Metabolite
Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
99 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603–04 (2010).
100 Of course, the patentable subject matter inquiry is only part of the patentability inquiry.
The claimed invention must also be useful, novel, non-obvious, and enabled. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101–103, 112 (2012).
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112’s written description requirement. 101 In addition, complex
algorithm patents are hard to enforce, especially when those algorithms
are embedded in medical practice, due to difficulties detecting when the
patented algorithm is being used. 102 However, the patent incentives for
diagnostic algorithms, while imperfect, were at least still available prior
to 2012.
2.

Mayo v. Prometheus

The Supreme Court’s decision in Prometheus dramatically changed
this situation by holding diagnostic methods essentially unpatentable. 103
Prometheus involved two patents of the type described above related to
the use of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases. 104 Claim 1 of
patent 6,355,623, which both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
took as exemplary, 105 claims
[a]
method
of
optimizing
therapeutic
efficacy
for
treatment . . . comprising: (a) administering a drug . . . and (b)
determining the level of [the metabolite] . . . wherein [a metabolite
level below a certain threshold] indicates a need to increase the
amount of said drug . . . and wherein [a metabolite level above a
different threshold] indicates a need to decrease the amount of said
drug subsequently administered to [the] subject.106

Prometheus Laboratories (Prometheus), the exclusive licensee of the
patents, sells diagnostic kits that embody the patented process. 107 Mayo
Clinic Rochester and Mayo Collaborative Services (collectively, Mayo)
bought those kits and used them until 2004, when Mayo decided to start
making, using, and selling its own kits, with slightly different metabolite
level limits. 108 Prometheus brought an infringement action in district
court, which held the patents infringed but invalid as claiming a natural
law. 109 The Federal Circuit reversed on the grounds that the patents’
“administering” and “determining” steps satisfied the “machine or
See discussion infra Section II.B.
See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, Essay, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900 (2013) (noting the difficulty in enforcing patents on information
about which treatments do not work).
103 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 1297–98
(2012).
104 Id. at 1294; U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 (filed
Dec. 27, 2001).
105 See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
106 U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 (filed Apr. 8, 1999).
107 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
108 Id. at 1295–96.
109 Id. at 1296.
101
102
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transformation” test, and therefore, held that the patents did not
encompass laws of nature. 110
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held the invention was not
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act. 111 Rather
than a “genuine application” of an unpatentable natural law, the court
said that the patent was invalid because it merely provides the natural
law and “tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine,
conventional activity”—namely, measuring metabolite levels and then
using Prometheus’s new information to inform treatment decisions. 112
Accordingly, the patent was invalid. 113 But this describes the majority of
medical diagnostics and black-box medicine.
Under the decision’s strikingly broad general analysis, many, if not
most, biological diagnostic tests can be characterized as only involving
steps that measure levels of biological molecules and then relating that
measurement to an underlying natural connection to provide
information about the patient’s biological characteristics, including
genes and their expression levels. 114 Under Prometheus, “routine,
obvious” pre- or post-solution activity cannot make a claim patentable if
it is primarily directed to a law of nature; thus, combining diagnostic
methods with standard practice procedures will typically not aid
patentability. 115 Notably, though the correlation in Prometheus was quite
simple, nothing in the opinion limits it to simple relationships, and the
Court explicitly eschewed choosing among different laws of nature.116

110 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2010). The full procedural history is somewhat more complex. The Federal Circuit held in 2009
that the patents claimed patentable subject matter under its then-dispositive “machine or
transformation test.” Prometheus Labs. Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded with instructions to
reconsider in light of its holding in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), that “the machine or
transformation test” was not dispositive, but was merely an important and useful clue to the
patentable subject matter inquiry. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 561 U.S.
1040 (2010). On remand, the Federal Circuit found the satisfaction of the test sufficient as a
clue to patentability and again held the patents as claiming patentable subject matter.
Prometheus, 628 F.3d at 1355, rev’d, 132 S. Ct. at 1296.
111 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 See, e.g., U. I. Schwarz, Clinical Relevance of Genetic Polymorphisms in the Human
CYP2C9 Gene, 33 EUR. J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION (SUPPLEMENT S2) 23, 23–30 (2003).
115 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
116 Id. at 1303 (“[O]ur cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature according
to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow. . . . [T]he cases have
endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and
the like . . . .”).
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Thus, the complexity of relationships in black-box medicine is unlikely
to make them patentable under section 101. 117
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued guidance to its
examiners espousing a broad interpretation of Prometheus, 118 and both
district courts and the Federal Circuit have invalidated diagnostic test
patents based on Prometheus. 119 Since most, if not all, diagnostic tests
center on identifying new laws of nature and inserting them into the
normal flow of clinical practice, Prometheus strikes directly at the

117 One potential alternate analysis would ask whether the interventions suggested by blackbox medicine would themselves be non-routine, which could help a tailored medical treatment
patent pass the Prometheus test. But this analysis would apply only to some methods. For
instance, a black-box algorithm’s suggestion to address the risk of a stroke by prescribing an
antidepressant might be viewed as a non-routine intervention, but an algorithm that merely
identified a buried risk of stroke and suggested normal treatment would likely be viewed as
engaging in routine activity. The uncertainty of this analysis could reduce patent incentives
even if some broader methods might still be patentable.
118 See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination
Policy to the Patent Examining Corps, 2014 Procedure for Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis of
Claims Reciting or Involving Laws of Nature/Natural Principles, Natural Phenomena, and/or
Natural Products (Mar. 4, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance],
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-mayo_guidance.pdf.
This
guidance
emphasizes that “all claims . . . reciting or involving laws of nature/natural principles, natural
phenomena, and/or natural products” must be analyzed using a three-part method:

[(i)] Is the claimed invention directed to one of the four statutory patent-eligible
subject matter categories: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter? . . . [(ii)] Does the claim recite or involve one or more judicial
exceptions? . . . Judicial exceptions include abstract ideas, laws of nature/natural
principles, natural phenomena, and natural products. . . . [(iii)] Does the claim as a
whole recite something significantly different than the judicial exception(s).
Id. at 2–3.
119 In PerkinElmer v. Intema, the Federal Circuit held invalid a claim over a test that
established the risk of fetal Down syndrome. PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 F. App’x 65,
71 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The claimed methods compared marker measurements with each other to
predict the risk of Down syndrome. Id. at 69. The claim was analogous to that in Prometheus,
and thus invalid, because it merely claimed a co-occurrence between biological molecules and a
natural statistical relationship. Id. at 71. Similarly, in SmartGene v. Advanced Biological
Laboratories, a nonprecedential opinion, the Federal Circuit held unpatentable a system
paradigmatic of black-box medicine-type diagnostics, though it relied on expert rules rather
than implicit relationships. SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950
(Fed. Cir. 2014). In the patent at issue, the representative claim 1 recited the steps of “(a)
providing patient information to a computing device comprising” of three different knowledge
bases: “therapeutic treatment regimens,” expert rules and advisory information useful for the
treatment of a particular disease or medical condition; “(b) generating . . . a ranked listing of
available therapeutic treatment regimens . . . ; and (c) generating . . . advisory information.” Id.
at 951–52. The Federal Circuit held that the patent covered abstract ideas, relying both on prior
Federal Circuit precedent and on Prometheus. See id. at 954–56. For further discussion, see
Timo Minssen & David Nilsson, The US Supreme Court in Mayo v. Prometheus—Taking the
Fire from or to Biotechnology and Personalized Medicine?, 2 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 376,
383 (2012).
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patentability of diagnostics and the personalized medicine of which they
are an integral part. 120
Other recent Supreme Court precedent has bolstered the
conclusion that diagnostic and black-box medicine innovations are
often unpatentable. In 2013, the Supreme Court held in Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics that isolated DNA sequences
and other isolated natural phenomena are unpatentable. 121 While the
decision did not directly address medical algorithms, patents on the raw
materials of medical analyses (genetic sequences, metabolites, RNA, and
the like) could have potentially provided a complement to nowunavailable patents on the analyses—but no longer. The Myriad patents
also claimed genetic diagnostic methods, which the Federal Circuit had
already held to be unpatentable subject matter under Prometheus. 122
Finally, in 2014, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International strengthened
Prometheus by clarifying that abstract inventions, such as algorithms, do
not become patentable merely because they are implemented on a
computer. 123 Perhaps more importantly, Alice vigorously reaffirmed the
principles and broad reach of Prometheus. 124 Prometheus, buttressed by
Myriad and Alice, is now likely to drive firms toward modest, explicit
improvements, and away from black-box medicine.
3.

The Impact of Prometheus on Personalized Medicine

Prometheus has major real-world effects on the industry and blackbox medicine. In addition to general negative reactions—such as
decreased venture capital investments in the diagnostic industry and
pessimistic outlooks125—firms may shift product focuses to those which
can still be successfully protected by patents. In addition, trade secrecy,
with its problems for oversight and cumulative innovation, becomes
more attractive by comparison. 126
120 See, e.g., Minssen & Nilsson, supra note 119, at 384 (“[C]laims that are broadly directed
to what may be considered to be a typical method exploited in personalized medicine will
probably be held to be unpatentable under the Prometheus principles.”). This is not to argue
that the previous patent system created ideal incentives for black-box medicine, a point
discussed further below. However, under prior law, at least some patent protection was
available.
121 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
122 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
123 See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014).
124 See id. Even if Prometheus were tightly limited, it would still cast doubt on the
patentability of the sort of diagnostic tests it directly addressed.
125 See Heidi Ledford, Software Patents Await Legal Fate, 507 NATURE 410, 410 (2014).
126 See discussion infra Section III.A.
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Because Prometheus makes natural laws and routine applications of
those laws unpatentable, firms may seek to strongly link newly
discovered natural laws to machines or to specific treatments. Indeed,
firms have done just that by increasing their emphasis on combination
products that pair a diagnostic with a device or drug, or both. 127 Since
such pairings involve substantially more than just stating a natural law,
they are likely still patent-eligible under Prometheus. 128 Combination
products tend to focus on simple, explicit links, and are tested and
brought through an FDA approval process that focuses on validating
those links in clinical trials. 129 Thus, while this change in focus by firms
may be entirely rational, it means that the contours of intellectual
property rights are pushing to keep the industry focused on explicit
personalized medicine, rather than devoting energy to the broader
algorithms, models, and datasets necessary to bring about the benefits of
black-box medicine.
The major problem with moving to a combination product model
is that it keeps personalized medicine firmly locked into the current
regime of incremental steps. This is not to disparage the potential
benefit of combination devices or explicit personalized medicine in
general. However, to the extent that firms attempt to maintain
patentability by focusing on simple, explicit links associated with
devices, they leave untapped the larger datasets and more complex
algorithms needed for black-box medicine and its leverage of complex
biological relationships. Reliance on combination products also limits
the development of medical algorithms largely to the pharmaceutical
and medical device industries, which have the capability to market such
combination products. Incentives for other entities—health-care payers,
informatics companies, or other parties that do not sell drugs—are
lower, and those firms may be less likely to innovate as a result.
In sum, though Prometheus and its kin may or may not be justified
on substantive patent law grounds—a debate into which this Article
does not wade—those cases seriously decrease the patent incentives
available in the United States for personalized medicine in general, and
for black-box medicine in particular. 130
127 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jason Karlawish, Biomarkers Unbound—The Supreme Court’s
Ruling on Diagnostic-Test Patents, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2338, 2340 (2012).
128 See 2014 USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, supra note 118.
129 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., IN VITRO
COMPANION DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/device
regulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm262327.pdf. In addition, even if the algorithm
is not patentable as part of the combination product, patents on the other part of the
combination—the drug or device—may obviate the need for an algorithm patent.
130 This Article considers only domestic protection and incentives; international analyses are
beyond its scope. The situation in Europe appears to differ substantially; methods like those at
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Section 112

Section 101’s patentable subject matter bar is not the only barrier to
patent availability for black-box medicine. A more prosaic hurdle comes
from the enablement, written description, and definiteness bars of
section 112. 131 These three requirements create substantial hurdles for
patenting black-box medicine, and though they do not eliminate the
possibility of patenting those inventions which survive the section 101
analysis described above, they further limit the availability of patent
incentives for black-box medicine.
Section 112 states that a patent
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art . . . to make and use the same . . . . The specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards
as the invention. 132

issue in Prometheus would likely be patentable subject matter under Article 52 of the European
Patent Convention (EPC), because they involve in vitro diagnostic tests performed on human
subjects. See Minssen & Nilsson, supra note 119, at 385–86; Paul Cole, Guest Post: Prometheus
v Mayo—A European View, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 3, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/04/
guest-post-prometheus-v-mayo-a-european-view.html. In fact, patents on the same methods as
in Prometheus were granted by the European Patent Office (EPO). Id. Those patents were not
the subject of opposition proceedings in the EPO, which therefore, did not rule on their
patentability (nor, to the author’s knowledge, has the EPO ruled on the patentability of
precisely analogous claims). However, Article 52(2) of the EPC states that “discoveries,
scientific theories and mathematical methods . . . [and] schemes, rules and methods for
performing mental acts” are not patentable inventions. Convention on the Grant of European
Patents art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 276 [hereinafter EPC art. 52(2)]. Thus, it is unclear
whether purely algorithmic innovations would be patentable. Even if such algorithms are
patentable in Europe, their inability to receive patents in the United States increases incentives
for firms to keep them secret, or pursue other innovations.
131 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). This argument has been addressed briefly in W. Nicholson
Price II, Describing Black-Box Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 347 (2015) [hereinafter Price,
Describing Black-Box Medicine]. To receive a patent, a black-box medicine implementation
must also satisfy the novelty requirement of § 102, 35 U.S.C. § 102, and the nonobviousness
requirement of § 103. 35 U.S.C. § 103. However, those requirements are not substantially
different in kind for black-box medicine than for other types of inventions. Potentially, the
opacity of an innovation might make it more difficult to determine the exact contours of
novelty, and to determine whether the invention was in fact disclosed in the prior art, but that
difficulty arises from the § 112 challenges discussed in this section, and therefore will not be
treated separately.
132 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b). Section 112 also requires that the patent applicant disclose the
best mode of practicing the invention, but under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, failing
to meet this requirement is no longer grounds for invalidating a patent. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 15, § 282(b)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
Accordingly, this toothless requirement will not be addressed here.
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This section has been interpreted to comprise three requirements: first,
the invention must be adequately described (written description);
second, the patent specification must enable others to practice the
invention (enablement); and third, the invention must be described in
such specific and definite terms as to clearly lay out the bounds of what
is claimed (definiteness). 133 The first two requirements are typically
grouped as a disclosure requirement, which serves the dual purposes of
informing others about the invention and of limiting the scope of what
is claimed. 134 However, “[a]lthough there is often significant overlap
between [them], they are nonetheless independent of each other.” 135 The
next three subsections consider each requirement’s challenges for
patenting black-box medicine.
1.

Enablement

The enablement requirement traditionally provided the bulk of
section 112’s impact. 136 Under this requirement, the patent specification
must enable a person having ordinary skill in the art (the PHOSITA) to
practice the invention without “undue experimentation.” 137 For
inventions requiring biological materials that are not reproducible
without undue experimentation, the requirement can be met by making
the materials available by depositing them in a public repository. 138
Satisfying the enablement requirement for black-box medicine
algorithms is certainly feasible, but creates significant limits on the
strength of those patents. Enablement serves both to require
133 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 123–30 (2006)
(summarizing section 112’s requirements).
134 See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1380–81
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that the enablement requirement “serves the dual function in the
patent system of ensuring adequate disclosure of the claimed invention and of preventing
claims broader than the disclosed invention”). See generally Jason Rantanen, Essay, Patent
Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 378–81 (2013) (arguing that the two
purposes are actually closely interrelated).
135 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
136 See Margaret Sampson, Comment, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written
Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1233 (2000).
137 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In Wands, the court described several
factors used to determine whether necessary experimentation is undue,

includ[ing] (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples,
(4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of
those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
breadth of the claims.
Id.

138

Id. at 735.
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disclosure—its ostensible raison d’etre—and to limit the scope of
claims. 139 The first of these functions is relatively easy for black-box
medicine, at least in principle. For algorithms that are formally
transparent and opaque-through-complexity, fully stating the algorithm
in the patent will likely enable a PHOSITA to practice that algorithm.
For algorithms that are formally opaque—that is, the product of opaque
machine-learning algorithms—enablement for that exact algorithm may
be achieved by depositing the data and machine-learning algorithm in a
publicly available database in the same manner as biological
inventions. 140 Nevertheless, this may be an unpalatable solution for
innovators seeking to keep their datasets proprietary and to guard their
machine-learning algorithms, and also raises substantial privacy
concerns. 141
The greater sting of the enablement requirement comes from the
rule that the scope of the claims must be commensurate with the scope
of the enablement; that is, an inventor cannot claim more than she has
enabled in the patent. 142 To claim a class, an inventor must be able to
generalize some aspects of the invention, and to justify that
generalization by reference to what members of the class have in
common. 143 The opacity of black-box medicine algorithms, whether
formal or practical, means that inventors will typically be unable to
generalize to broaden claims beyond those algorithms that are precisely
disclosed in the specification. This may be a justifiable result, but others
will much more easily be able to invent around any covered algorithms,
leading to weaker patents—and, consequently, weaker patent-provided
incentives for initial innovation. 144
139 ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 263–64 (6th ed. 2013).
140 Cf. id.
141 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 454–57. While the HIPAA places
substantial restrictions on the use and disclosure of personal health information, it does not
apply to anonymous information, so anonymous deposition would resolve HIPAA concerns.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2015).
142 In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“The relevant inquiry may be summed
up as being whether the scope of enablement provided to one of ordinary skill in the art by the
disclosure is such as to be commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims.”).
143 See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895); Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 849–50 (1990)
(discussing the case and the appropriate scope of enablement).
144 The possibility of regulatory pre-approval for black-box medicine algorithms has the
potential to change this dynamic significantly. If a particular algorithm must be approved by a
regulator—most likely, FDA—before marketing and use, inventing around becomes a less
attractive option because alternate algorithms must also undergo a presumably costly FDA
approval process. This patent-strengthening dynamic is seen in drug patents, which are
especially strong because FDA approves exactly the drug covered (presumably) in the relevant
patent, and not similar drugs. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (discussing this dynamic). FDA approval would similarly strengthen
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Written Description

The specification of a patent “shall contain a written description of
the invention.”145 The Federal Circuit has held that this requirement is
separate from the enablement requirement. 146 It serves to protect against
overbroad or premature patenting, and limits the scope of the
invention. 147 The inventor must actually possess the claimed invention
at the time of filing—whether through actual or constructive reduction
to practice—and must demonstrate that possession by describing the
invention fully. 148
Meeting the written description requirement ranges from
moderately difficult, for instances where an algorithm is merely opaquethrough-complexity, to extremely challenging, when the process is
formally opaque. 149 In the first case, an algorithm can be stated even if
the explanation offers little understanding; patents need not describe
why the invention works, just that it does and how someone can
replicate it. 150 In the second case, actually describing a fully opaque
algorithm in words may be impossible. However, inventors may be able
to demonstrate possession of the invention in the same way as they can
enable inventions that require otherwise unavailable starting
materials—by depositing everything necessary to recreate the algorithm
(or the final algorithm, to the extent that is actually different) in a
publicly accessible repository. 151 Another option, which has been
suggested in the context of difficult-to-characterize biologic drugs, is
making greater use of product-by-process claims, under which the
narrow black-box algorithm patents. Regulation of black-box medicine and medical algorithms
generally is beyond the scope of this piece, but is discussed further in Price, Black-Box
Medicine, supra note 7, and W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Algorithmic and Black-Box
Medicine 11–45 (Sept. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
145 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
146 The written description requirement is analytically and practically distinct from
enablement, though the two often stand or fall together, especially outside the
biopharmaceutical industry. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352–53
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting the analytical distinction between the two requirements and giving
examples of enablement without adequate written description in biological and chemical
contexts).
147 Id. at 1351 (“[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied
upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the
claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”). See generally Holbrook, supra note 133.
148 Id.
149 Price, Describing Black-Box Medicine, supra note 131, at 353–56.
150 See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is not a requirement of
patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, or even know, how or why the invention
works . . . .”). Notably, however, with a lack of understanding, it becomes more difficult for the
patentee to claim broader subject matter protection under the enablement requirement, as
described above. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
151 See Price, Describing Black-Box Medicine, supra note 131, at 353–56.
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algorithm is claimed via a detailed description of how it was generated,
even if the algorithm itself cannot be fully described. 152
3.

Definiteness

Finally, section 112 requires that an invention be claimed in
definite terms. 153 This requirement is intended to make clear to others
the meets and bounds of the claimed invention. 154 Claims using
ambiguous language, such as “words of degree,” may be indefinite
unless the context of the invention, the knowledge of the PHOSITA, and
the disclosure of the specification, taken together, inform the PHOSITA
of what is claimed with reasonable certainty. 155 Although definiteness
has long been a very low bar for a patent applicant to meet, the Supreme
Court recently took steps to raise that bar in Nautilus v. Biosig
Instruments. 156 The Federal Circuit’s reaction has been muted at best,
leaving this area of law contested and unsettled. 157
The ability of opaque algorithms to meet the evolving definiteness
standard is currently untested. Presumably, courts will recognize the
inherent indefiniteness in the field, which can make otherwise indefinite
language permissible. On the other hand, the need to make terms as
definite as possible will likely restrict the scope of what can be validly
claimed, leading to narrow patents. 158
152 See Dmitry Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and
Biotechnology’s Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J.
109 (2011) (describing product-by-process claims for biotechnology inventions). Note that
such deposits may face other challenges for black-box medicine algorithms, since reproducing
them will typically require access to the same data as the original algorithm. However, making
that data publicly available raises incentive problems for the first inventor and possibly other
regulatory complications such as compliance with health privacy laws. As I argue here, infra
Section IV.A, and elsewhere, Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 450, moving to a
public or public/private infrastructure model with greater data disclosure would help resolve
these problems.
153 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
154 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (“[A] patent is
invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent,
and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention.”).
155 Biosig Instruments v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
156 See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2120.
157 See Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 430, 439–443 (2015) (describing the history of the definiteness requirement and the
Supreme Court’s holding in Nautilus, and noting that “[t]he Federal Circuit’s post-Nautilus
decisions do not even hint at a raised standard, either formally or in application”).
158 See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. In section 112(f) means-plus-function
claims, the Federal Circuit has held that algorithms (though not necessarily computer code)
must typically be disclosed in the specifications to avoid patent invalidity for indefiniteness. See,
e.g., Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting that
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Overall, patent incentives are very low for black-box medicine.
Algorithms are frequently unpatentable under section 101 doctrine, and
in those instances where algorithms can constitute patentable subject
matter—for instance, when they are linked with something substantially
more than just the algorithm or law of nature itself—the requirements
of section 112 will strongly limit the scope and availability of the
resulting claims. Even when patents are available, they may be
particularly difficult to enforce, as algorithm use may not be a visible
part of medical care in many instances. 159 Patents provide little incentive
for black-box algorithms, and none at all for investment in the hurdles
of datasets or validation. Patents are not the only form of external
incentive for investment in innovative information goods, however, and
the next Part turns to non-patent incentives, considering both secrecy
and other direct investment incentives.
III. NON-PATENT INCENTIVES
Other policy incentives can complement patent law. This Part
describes the current incentive landscape for two types of innovation
incentive: trade secrecy, which provides a limited form of governmentprotected appropriability; and direct government incentives, including
grants, prizes, and tax incentives.
A.

Secrecy

Trade secrecy is the principal private law alternative to the patent
system for protecting technological innovation. 160 Actual secrecy—that
is, effectively keeping information from other parties, including
competitors—allows appropriation of innovative information and thus
enables the innovator to charge supracompetitive prices. Actual secrecy
is enhanced by the doctrine of trade secrecy. 161 Knowledge which is
an abstract “black box that performs a recited function” mentioned in the specification failed to
disclose a structure sufficient for section 112(f), although an ordinarily skilled artisan might
nonetheless have been enabled to practice the invention). Such disclosure runs into the linked
problems mentioned above. See supra Sections II.B.1–2.
159 See Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 102 (noting that medical treatment knowledge,
especially knowledge about what treatments don’t work, is hard to exclude and that related
patents are hard to enforce).
160 See Bone, supra note 83, at 243
161 Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008) [hereinafter Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets
as IP Rights] (arguing that trade secrecy doctrine facilitates disclosure by reducing the need to
invest in means to ensure actual secrecy).
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reasonably kept secret and which derives independent economic value
from its secrecy is protected from misappropriation by state and federal
trade secret law. 162 However, secret information can legally be reverseengineered or independently created. 163 Trade secrecy can protect
information that is unpatentable, and lasts as long as the information is
secret. 164
Secrecy creates a mixed set of incentives and effects for black-box
medicine. For two types of innovative information, datasets and
algorithms, secrecy can protect effectively against competition, at least
in some circumstances. On the other hand, secrecy also creates
substantial problems for those two types of innovation by restricting
both cumulative innovation and the benefits gained from others’ access
to aggregated information and algorithms. The third form of necessary
innovation investment—validation—gains no incentives from secrecy,
as validation must be shared to be valuable, but is hampered by secrecy
applied to datasets or algorithms.
1.

Data

Sets of data are not generally protectable with patents or copyrights
in the United States, but can be kept secret. 165 The clearest example is
Myriad Genetics itself. 166 Both before and after its loss in the Supreme
Court, the company has kept much of its information about genetic
variation secret. 167 Myriad’s gene testing process reveals combinations of
alleles present in patients; the company then offers free testing to family
members, and analyzes family variation to determine significantly
162 Forty-seven states have enacted some form of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, with the
exception of North Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts, the latter two of which have
planned 2016 introductions. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%
20Act (last visited Jan. 14, 2016). Under federal law, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
makes the theft or misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832
(2012).
163 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (listing
reverse engineering as a proper means of acquiring a trade secret).
164 See Bone, supra note 83, at 248.
165 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (“That there
can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”) In Europe, a sui generis system of
database protection has existed since 1996. Council Directive 96/9/EC, art. 3, 7, 1996 O.J. (L
077)
20
(EU),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:
31996L0009&from=EN.
166 See Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, supra note 29; see also
Burk, supra note 61 (discussing the role of patents in allowing Myriad Genetics to assemble a
large and useful dataset of BRCA1 and BRCA2 (breast and ovarian predisposition genes)).
167 Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic Testing: Clinical Data as
Trade Secrets?, 21 EUROPEAN J. HUM. GENETICS 585, 585–86 (2013).
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linked genetic patterns. 168 Since Myriad has a substantially greater set of
data on BRCA1/2 variants, only three percent of its samples have
variants of unknown significance; 169 for competitors, the rate is roughly
twenty percent to thirty percent. 170 Test samples sent to Myriad are,
therefore, much less likely to be returned to the physician as
“uninterpretable” than samples sent to its competitors, 171 providing a
robust competitive advantage. While Myriad’s data advantage could be
overcome as other firms slowly assemble their own databases, the fact
that Myriad currently possesses a much larger database—amassed from
its period of patent protection—is self-reinforcing. 172 Myriad can
provide more results, and is therefore likely to continue receiving more
test samples, while the resulting larger database would still be kept as a
trade secret. 173 Myriad’s business plan includes retaining and expanding
this secrecy-based advantage of mutation data and its relatively simple
algorithms. 174
Although the proprietary nature of datasets helps firms protect and
recoup their investments, it also hampers future innovation. 175 This
effect is especially important for black-box medicine because it relies on
Id. at 585.
Id. In a genetic test like Myriad’s, the physical process first determines which alleles of a
gene the patient has. That identification must then be interpreted to convey useful medical
information: Are the alleles associated with a higher or a lower risk of cancer, or with no
change? Douglas F. Easton et al., A Systematic Genetic Assessment of 1,433 Sequence Variants of
Unknown Clinical Significance in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 Breast Cancer-Predisposition Genes,
81 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 873, 873 (2007). When the interpreting entity lacks sufficient
information about a particular allele to provide a useful interpretation, it is termed a “variant of
unknown significance,” and that part of the test is inconclusive. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note
167, at 585.
170 Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 167, at 585.
171 Id. at 585–86.
172 See Burk, supra note 61, at 239–40.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 240–41.
175 Keeping data proprietary raises several other potential concerns. On the ethical side, the
Chairwoman of the European Society of Human Genetics’ Professional and Public Policy
committee described the committee as “very concerned that such important data is being
withheld from those who most need it.” Press Release, Eur. Soc’y of Human Genetics, Privately
Owned Genetic Databases May Hinder Diagnosis and Bar the Way to the Arrival of
Personalised Medicine: ESHG Reacts to Today’s Report in the European Journal of Human
Genetics (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.eshg.org/13.0.html. She suggested that “[p]olicymakers
should take an urgent look at the regulatory and reimbursement issues involved in genomic
testing in order for all the data that is essential to understanding the clinical significance of
[mutations] to be made public, to the benefit of patients and healthcare providers alike.” Id.
Others have noted that keeping data proprietary removes them from the potential of peer
review and makes us less certain of their accuracy. See Misha Angrist & Robert Cook-Deegan,
Distributing the Future: The Weak Justifications for Keeping Human Genomic Databases Secret
and the Challenges and Opportunities in Reverse Engineering Them, 3 APPLIED &
TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 124, 125 (2014). Other concerns arise with respect to transparency,
oversight, and the blocking of future research directions.
168
169
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very large datasets to identify and use otherwise inaccessible complex
patterns. When data are kept in company-specific silos that are focused
on a particular set of identifiable characteristics or relationships, those
data are typically unavailable for use in finding relationships that we
have not yet—or cannot yet—identify. Thus, even if proprietary datasets
can be justified, arguendo, to facilitate specific, explicit forms of
innovative medicine, 176 that justification may fall in the context of
developing next-generation algorithms such as those in black-box
medicine. Trade secrecy slows cumulative innovation and promotes
duplicative investment, 177 and these dynamics are especially strong in
this context.
2.

Algorithms

Secrecy for algorithms also provides incentives by preventing
appropriation, but creates a different set of problems. A black-box
algorithm itself is unavoidably secret, by definition, but the surrounding
information—principally, how the algorithm is developed and trained—
can be disclosed or kept secret. If the bulk of information about an
algorithm is kept secret, only the inventor can use it, and can
accordingly charge monopoly rents (up to the value of the product, of
course). Secrecy is accordingly used frequently to protect the
commercial value of algorithms in other fields, and could be similarly
used for black-box medicine. 178
The challenge is that secret algorithms are hard to oversee, hard to
trust, hard to validate, and cannot form the foundation of later
cumulative innovation. Secret algorithms would be more difficult for
regulators to oversee, although mechanisms do exist for regulators like
FDA to receive and evaluate secret information while maintaining its
confidentiality. 179 These mechanisms are harder to stretch to private
third parties who would need information about how an algorithm was
developed in order to verify its quality. From a policy perspective,
176 See Burk, supra note 61; Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing,
supra note 29, at 56.
177 Bone, supra note 83, at 266, 269; Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade
Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2014). For a defense of treating trade secrecy as intellectual
property, see Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, supra note
161, at 329–38.
178 In The Black-Box Society, Frank Pasquale extensively describes the role of deliberately
opaque algorithms, which he dubs “black-box” algorithms based on that deliberate opacity, and
cites the extensive commercial use of secret algorithms in, inter alia, the financial industry. See
PASQUALE, supra note 11.
179 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2012) (prohibiting the use of information concerning “any
method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection” that is submitted to FDA).
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secrecy about algorithm development makes cumulative innovation
harder, as others cannot learn what works and what doesn’t. Finally,
deliberately secret algorithms amplify the challenge of getting doctors
and patients to adopt medical technology that is not well-understood
and that is, in fact, not fully understandable. 180
3.

Validation

Finally, as described above, third-party validation of black-box
algorithms is key for demonstrating their accuracy and utility.
Therefore, secrecy is unavailable to create incentives for third parties to
validate the strength and accuracy of algorithms. Secrecy of algorithms
themselves also makes validation harder by limiting third-party access
to the details needed to validate those algorithms.
B.

Non-Exclusivity Incentives

In addition to the exclusivity incentives described above—patents
and trade secrecy—other policy incentives are available to spur
innovation. A significant and expanding scholarly literature addresses
the use of grants and prizes as innovation incentives, 181 and tax
incentives for research have recently been recognized as an important
part of the mix. 182 These mechanisms differ from exclusivity incentives
in that rather than relying on appropriation or exclusivity to allow
supracompetitive pricing, which recompenses innovation ex post
through higher prices on the users of an innovation, they typically
provide innovators with funds raised from a broader taxpayer base
(whether ex ante or ex post). 183
Because these funding mechanisms do not rely on exclusivity, they
do not themselves impose limits on others’ use of the innovation, which
can potentially increase distribution of the innovation. Non-exclusivity
mechanisms can, however, be combined with exclusivity mechanisms,
and frequently are; an invention may be funded by a federal grant in a
research university, patented by the university, and then licensed to a
See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 7, at 465.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003);
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV.
303 (2013); Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U.
CHI. L. REV. 999 (2014) [hereinafter Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes]; Joseph Stiglitz,
Give Prizes Not Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21.
182 Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 181.
183 Id.
180
181
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firm that receives tax incentives for further research before commercial
production. 184 It is thus a mistake to think that incentive mechanisms
that do not require exclusivity will result in wide access to the
innovation. If it is desirable that exclusivity be avoided, non-exclusivity
funding mechanisms need to contain conditions to that effect, such as a
prize requiring that competing firms commit not to patent the
invention.
This Section does not attempt to catalog the prizes, grants, and tax
incentives that may be generally available for black-box medicine. Since
the field is burgeoning, specifically focused incentives are substantially
rarer than general-purpose incentives. There is, however, one notable
exception: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative. 185
The Precision Medicine Initiative, announced in the State of the
Union Address in 2015, proposes to direct $215 million to personalized
medicine research over the next ten years. 186 In the short term, the
initiative focuses on more explicit personalized medicine goals,
particularly identifying differentiable cancer treatments in partnership
with pharmaceutical companies and through typical clinical trial
methods. 187 However, the longer-term goals of the initiative are (1) to
support a national scientific network and (2) to develop a “national
cohort study” of at least one million participants who will share genomic
information and biological samples as well as clinical health data. 188 The
former goal presumably includes additional grant funding targeted at
personalized medicine, including black-box methods; the latter goal is
an important step in addressing the data hurdle, 189 and recognizes the
184 For instance, researchers at Columbia University developed cotransformation, a powerful
and basic biotechnology process for introducing foreign DNA into eukaryotic cells. See
Alessandra Colaianni & Robert Cook-Deegan, Columbia University’s Axel Patents: Technology
Transfer and Implications for the Bayh-Dole Act, 87 MILBANK Q. 683 (2009) (describing the
development of the technology). The initial work was funded by grants from the National
Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation. Michael Wigler et al.,
Transformation of Mammalian Cells with Genes from Procaryotes and Eucaryotes, 16 CELL 777,
785 (1979). Patents on the resulting technology were licensed to thirty-four firms and eventual
licensing revenues reached $790 million. Colaianni & Cook-Deegan, supra, at 700. Biogen
licensed the patented technology in its Multiple Sclerosis drug Avonex. Ted Agres, Columbia
Patents Under Attack, SCIENTIST (July 25, 2003), http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/
articleNo/22353. The company benefits from substantial tax credits for its research and
development spending. See Taking Credit, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424127887324688404578543791391933684 (listing corporate R&D tax
benefits).
185 See Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative, supra note 34.
186 Id.
187 See Collins & Varmus, supra note 4, at 793–94; see also Precision Medicine Initiative:
Near-Term Goals, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://nihprod.cit.nih.gov/precisionmedicine/
goals.htm (last updated Oct. 13, 2015).
188 See Collins & Varmus, supra note 4, at 794–95.
189 See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
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significant upside of centralized data collection for distributed
research. 190
The Precision Medicine Initiative is a significant step forward in
non-exclusivity incentives and aids to innovation. However, the
innovation incentive story remains problematic at an overall level, with
relatively few incentives available for the development of black-box
medicine.
IV. IMPROVING INCENTIVES
The absence of appropriate incentives significantly impedes the
development of black-box medicine; more directly, some available
incentives, like the particular contours of patentable subject matter,
actively drive the development of personalized medicine in unhelpful
directions. 191 Accordingly, the final Part of this Article briefly proposes
potential improvements to the existing incentive structure.
Because the development process involves distinct forms of
innovation, incentives are most usefully considered separately for each
form. Generating large and well-curated datasets likely requires the
greatest investment. Patents are unavailable for datasets, and trade
secrecy is relatively ill-suited to consolidation and cumulative
innovation. Instead, the amassing of high-quality datasets might better
be conceived as an infrastructure for further innovation, which suggests
a role for more direct government involvement. An additional
possibility is the implementation of a tailored sui generis dataset
protection regime, such as exists under European Union law. 192
Second, black-box medicine development requires incentives for
the generation of algorithms. As described above, algorithms were
previously patent-eligible, 193 so one potential incentive for developing
algorithms would come from reinstating patent protection for them.
This solution, however, comes with its own set of complications.
Regulatory exclusivity might be preferable, although that would require
a regulatory preapproval regime that currently does not exist. Prizes are
another potential solution 194; although they are subject to many of the
same general innovation considerations as patents, they are typically
more flexible to implement.
Third, incentives are needed for validation. An ever-present
concern in complex implicit models—especially when developed via
190
191
192
193
194

See infra Section IV.A.
See discussion supra Section II.A.3.
See Council Directive 96/9/EC, art. 3, 7, 1996 O.J. (L 077) 20 (EU).
See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
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black-box methods—is ensuring that they are valid and generally
applicable, rather than just statistical artifacts arising from overspecification in large datasets. This Article will thus present potential
structures for regulatory “bounties”: rewards provided to competitor
firms for either validating or substantially falsifying the black-box
medicine algorithms of the innovator firms.
A.

Incentives for Datasets: The Infrastructure Model

As described above, significant hurdles exist in the collection of
large, high quality datasets available for the development of black-box
medicine algorithms. 195 Patents are unavailable and trade secrecy
presents problems discussed above: it lends itself to fragmenting rather
than consolidating information, restricts cumulative innovation, and
creates advantages for incumbents—like Myriad Genetics—which may
continue indefinite specific monopolies. 196 To increase incentives,
therefore, policymakers could turn to direct government intervention or
a public-private partnership focused on data as infrastructure. 197
In the context of genetic testing, the secrecy that protects the
databases of incumbent firms has been analogized to an infrastructure
problem, wherein specific sets of correlations—namely, the significance
of individual genetic variations—have several features of essential
facilities. 198 Datasets for black-box medicine development may similarly
take the role of common infrastructure for further innovation. Rather
than conceiving of datasets as innovation themselves, they could be
viewed as shared resources that enable firms to develop innovative

See infra Section II.A.
For a detailed description of this problem, see Evans, Economic Regulation of NextGeneration Sequencing, supra note 29.
197 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005) (discussing infrastructure and the benefits of
managing infrastructure as a commons when social and public outputs are facilitated).
Alternately, policymakers could attempt to develop a sui generis system of database protection
modeled on the European system, though that would fail to solve the problems of data
fragmentation. Under Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, databases, defined as “a collection of
independent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and
individually accessible by electronic or other means,” Council Directive 96/9/EC, art. 1, 1996
O.J. (L 077) 20 (EU), are covered by copyright if they involve creative choices, but are otherwise
covered by a sui generis intellectual property right, so long as their creation involved
“substantial investment.” Id. art. 3, 7. Database owners may prevent others from extracting or
re-utilizing the whole or a substantial part of the database for approximately fifteen years from
publication or, if the database is kept private, completion, and may be extended by additional
substantial investment. Id. art. 10.
198 Evans, Sustainable Access to Data, supra note 54.
195
196
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algorithms. 199 As Brett Frischmann has noted, accessible infrastructure
resources are particularly valuable where social and public gains may be
difficult to value commercially; broad improvements in medical care fit
this model well. 200
Under this view, direct or indirect government intervention could
usefully aid the generation of datasets. On a direct level, collecting data
shows a prima facie advantage for government. In the United States,
many millions of patients participate in Medicare and Medicaid, where
the government provision of insurance allows access to patients’
medical records. 201 The Department of Defense and the Department of
Veterans Affairs provide direct health care to and consequently collect
data for over eleven million military personnel, veterans, and their
families. 202 In other nations, the concentration of data with the
government is even stronger. For example, the U.K. National Health
Service (NHS) provides free health care to over sixty-three million U.K.
residents, 203 and consequently accumulates tremendous amounts of
data.
Government possession of data brings its own challenges. For
instance, it is emphatically not the case that the data gathered by the
Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs are neatly
available in high-quality interoperable formats. In fact, the two agencies
have spent billions trying and failing to upgrade their electronic records
systems, which remain incompatible. 204 And the U.K.’s NHS, while it
has a great deal of data, is prevented by strict privacy rules from using
199 Others have called for collation and availability of health data, notably Marc A. Rodwin,
The Case for Public Ownership of Patient Data, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 86 (2009); cf. Evans,
Sustainable Access to Data, supra note 54 (discussing data access to FDA’s Sentinel data);
Evans, Economic Regulation of Next-Generation Sequencing, supra note 29 (describing concerns
about data sharing of genomic information).
200 Frischmann, supra note 197, at 996 (using malaria research as an example of an endeavor
with high social value, but with low commercial value relative to the research costs).
201 See Total Monthly Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://
kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/total-monthly-medicaid-and-chip-enrollment (last visited
Jan. 14, 2016) (noting 71.8 million Medicaid/CHIP enrollees in October 2015); Total Number of
Medicare Beneficiaries, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/totalmedicare-beneficiaries (last visited Jan. 14, 2016) (noting 49.4 million Medicare beneficiaries in
2012).
202 Tricare, which offers health for military personnel, had 9.2 million eligible beneficiaries
in 2008. See TRICARE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, BASIC FACTS OF THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM
(2008), http://www.tricare.mil/stakeholders/statistics.cfm. The Veterans Health Administration
had 9.1 million enrollees in 2014. See VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, SELECTED VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION CHARACTERISTICS: FY2002 TO
FY2014 (2015), http://www.va.gov/vetdata/docs/Utilization/VHAStats_2014.xlsx.
203 About the National Health Service (NHS), NAT’L HEALTH SERV., http://www.nhs.uk/
NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx (last updated July 1, 2015).
204 Hannah Winston, Billions Wasted on Fruitless Bid to Create Paperless Vet Health
Records, NBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2013, 3:32 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/billionswasted-fruitless-bid-create-paperless-vet-health-records-f8C11001233.
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much of it, and certainly from sharing information with third-party
private algorithm developers. 205 However, government entities are
taking steps in the direction of data collection, even if not in sharing: the
Veterans Health Administration is well into its effort to collect genetic
and phenotypic information on a million veterans for research
purposes. 206 But there are currently no indications that this
information—or other information like it—will be made available for
further innovation by private entities.
The other existing large government initiative in this area is FDA’s
Sentinel initiative. Sentinel is designed to collect and analyze drug safety
data on very large populations—with a goal of acquiring health data on
over 100 million Americans—to provide further information on postapproval drug safety. 207 In the Sentinel project, FDA has taken on the
role of an infrastructure regulator in facilitating the development of a
longitudinal health records database of insurance claims information,
medical records, prescription drug records, and information from
military care and Medicare. 208 FDA’s involvement, along with the
authorizing statute, enables FDA to cut through some of the legal and
practical hurdles to assembling datasets; the drug safety analysis is
conceived as part of the agency’s public health authority, which allows it
to fit into an exception to normal limitations on transferring and using
identifiable data. 209 A pilot project, Mini-Sentinel, has already been
developed in association with private institutional partners, and is
actively engaged in drug safety research. 210 FDA’s Sentinel-related
safety-centered statutory authority could potentially extend to cover
substantial swathes of research on differential impacts of drugs, since
efficacy and safety are intertwined in evaluating drugs. 211 Furthermore,
205 Others have noted the richness of the NHS’s data and the challenge of its privacy rules.
See Wayne Parslow, How Big Data Could Be Used to Predict a Patient’s Future, GUARDIAN (Jan.
17, 2014, 3:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2014/jan/17/big-datanhs-predict-illness (“Although currently shielded by privacy rules, the personal data that can
risk score every NHS patient already exists. And it is already far more centralised and
normalised than in countries such as the US, giving the UK the opportunity to become the
world leader.”).
206 See Million Veteran Program (MVP), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://
www.research.va.gov/MVP (last updated Dec. 15, 2015).
207 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (2012) (setting a goal of 100 million patients for
postmarket risk identification and safety analysis by July 1, 2012).
208 Id. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(III)(aa)–(cc); see also Barbara J. Evans, Congress’ New
Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 588 (2009) [hereinafter
Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy].
209 Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, supra note 208, at 598.
210 Susan Forrow et al., The Organizational Structure and Governing Principles of the Food
and Drug Administration’s Mini-Sentinel Pilot Program, 21 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG
SAFETY (SUPPLEMENT S1) 12 (2012).
211 Evans, Congress’ New Infrastructural Model of Medical Privacy, supra note 208, at 601.
On the other hand, broad research questions that stray beyond the actual public health use
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FDA could centralize the data it collects and make the data available to
other researchers to pursue these research avenues. 212 However, the
Sentinel project is not taking this broad and centralized infrastructure
path. Instead, so far Mini-Sentinel has been focused on traditional views
of drug safety and adverse events. 213 More importantly, rather than
creating a centralized dataset, FDA has pursued a distributed model in
which it develops research queries and then transmits those queries to
its institutional partners (hospitals, health systems, and the like) that
actually hold the data, before those partners transmit de-identified
answers back. 214 Thus, although Sentinel has the potential and promise
to be the type of centralized research dataset that could provide wideranging infrastructure for the development of black-box medicine, it
seems that FDA is taking the project in a different direction.
Nevertheless, the structure of Sentinel, and the authority that is vested
in FDA by its statute, indicates at least the potential for broader
government intervention into enabling datasets for future research.
The federal government is also pursuing a different, de novo path
to creating a new dataset as part of the Precision Medicine Initiative,
which seeks to support personalized medicine, in part by creating a
national cohort study containing the genomic data, clinical data, and
biological samples of at least one million subjects; 215 this would be much
smaller than the Sentinel dataset, but still quite substantial. Although the
exact contours of the eventual cohort are unclear, it is likely to involve
existing patient networks. 216 The Initiative also clearly contemplates
federal funding to lay the groundwork for this dataset—the
infrastructure for the data infrastructure, so to speak—including a
projected ten million dollars for FDA “to acquire additional expertise
and advance the development of high quality, curated databases to
support the regulatory structure needed to advance innovation in
precision medicine and protect public health,” and five million dollars
for the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
function of the Sentinel system might run afoul of HIPAA regulations that treat research
differently. Id. at 615–16. Further public perception difficulties may arise if FDA broadened
Sentinel’s mission, since there is a distinct tradeoff between public health benefits and privacy;
as research broadens, privacy protections diminish when more data is spread among more
research projects and, presumably, more researchers. Id. at 605.
212 Id. at 601–03.
213 See Background, MINI-SENTINEL, http://mini-sentinel.org/about_us/default.aspx (last
updated Sept. 18, 2014) (“Mini-Sentinel monitors the safety of FDA-regulated medical products
through assessment of routinely collected electronic healthcare data in response to FDA
concerns.”).
214 Forrow et al., supra note 210, at 14–15.
215 Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Precision Medicine Initiative, supra note 34.
216 Id. (“This ambitious project will leverage existing research and clinical networks and
build on innovative research models that enable patients to be active participants and
partners.”).
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Technology “to support the development of interoperability standards
and requirements that address privacy and enable secure exchange of
data across systems.” 217 The data from this cohort study will be “broadly
accessible to qualified researchers,” though the definition of “qualified
researchers” and any limitations to the acceptable research use of the
data remain to be determined. 218
The government could take this approach in a different direction
to enable black-box medicine (and other personalized medicine) by
simplifying the data collection step, generating the datasetinfrastructure, and then allowing private parties to compete in the
analysis and validation steps. Data access could be leveraged in at least
two ways. First, the data could be used exclusively for some time; firms
could bid for access to segments of the data, coupled with a
commitment to make any resulting algorithms publicly available after
some period of exclusivity. 219 Second, the data could be made freely
available, but with the caveat that firms using the data disclose their
algorithms. This would enable a broader set of concurrent
developments, while still allowing firms to capture benefits of their
(reduced) innovation investments. 220
Similar options exist to pursue database generation through publicprivate partnerships. deCODE Genomics famously exemplifies such a
partnership. The Icelandic biopharmaceutical firm successfully lobbied
the Icelandic Parliament to create a population-wide Health Sector
Database including genomic, genealogical, and health information.221
Court challenges shifted the database from mandatory to voluntary,222
and the effort was highly controversial, 223 but over 160,000 individuals
still volunteered, 224 and the company has published extensively on the
Id.
See id.
219 This approach has potential political economy problems related to its implementation;
the specter of the government collecting health records and turning them over to private parties
for their exclusive benefit would likely meet substantial resistance. This dynamic certainly exists
in other frameworks—notably in the patenting of government-funded innovation under the
Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, sec. 6(a), §§ 200–211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019—but may be even
more politically sensitive in the context of health information.
220 This plan would also potentially avoid some of the political economy problems discussed
supra note 219. However, it would exacerbate privacy and reidentification concerns. See Cohen
et al., supra note 43.
221 Vilhjálmur Árnason, Coding and Consent: Moral Challenges of the Database Project in
Iceland, 18 BIOETHICS 27 (2004).
222 Renate Gertz, An Analysis of the Icelandic Supreme Court Judgement on the Health Sector
Database Act, 1 SCRIPT-ED 241 (2004).
223 See, e.g., Árnason, supra note 221; Jeffrey R. Gulcher & Kari Stefánsson, The Icelandic
Healthcare Database and Informed Consent, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1827 (2000).
224 Unrivaled Capabilities, DECODE GENETICS, http://www.decode.com/research (last visited
Feb. 1, 2016).
217
218
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explicit genomic links it has found. 225 Similarly, the Human Genome
Project provides another clear precedent. There, a collaborative effort
between government and private researchers sequenced the human
genome with the intention of providing it freely to future researchers
and innovators as a common infrastructure resource. 226
B.

Incentives for Algorithms

The heart of black-box medicine is the development of
biomedically useful algorithms by plumbing the masses of health data. 227
However, as described above, this process is neither easy nor
inexpensive. 228 And current intellectual protection is both inadequate
and skewed away from black-box medicine. Accordingly, better
incentives are needed to drive algorithm development. Potential
incentives could come in at least three forms: patent protection,
regulatory exclusivity, or prizes.
1.

Patents

Patents are an obvious source of incentives for algorithms, as they
were generally available for algorithms until the Supreme Court’s
decision in Prometheus. 229 Congress could override that statutory
interpretation decision by amending the statute to, for instance, state
that novel diagnostic algorithms are patent-eligible subject matter.
While this approach is initially attractive, challenges arise in both
enactment and enforcement.
First, overruling Prometheus may face problems of overbreadth. In
particular, black-box medicine is similar to mainstream computer
software patents and algorithms, which are criticized by academics,
frequently disliked by the software industry itself, and a target of reform
efforts. 230 Broad-brush patent changes to revive algorithmic patents
225 See, e.g., Thorlakur Jonsson et al., A Mutation in APP Protects Against Alzheimer’s
Disease and Age-Related Cognitive Decline, 488 NATURE 96 (2012); Unnur Styrkarsdottir et al.,
Nonsense Mutation in the LGR4 Gene Is Associated with Several Human Diseases and Other
Traits, 497 NATURE 517 (2013).
226 Francis S. Collins et al., The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology,
300 SCI. 286 (2003).
227 See discussion supra Section I.A.
228 See discussion supra Section II.B.
229 See discussion supra Section II.A.1.
230 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325 (2012); Jay
Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Business-Method Patents,
43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823 (2003); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY
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may, therefore, face considerable resistance and may also have negative
impacts on other industries. 231 Finally, of course, the Supreme Court
may have correctly judged the innovation incentives regarding laws of
nature and determined that patents on relationship-based algorithms
may be harder to invent around and therefore may block overall
innovation. 232
Second, patents granted on black-box medicine algorithms face
significant difficulties in enforcement. Knowing whether infringement
is occurring and proving that it has occurred are both likely to be
difficult, especially for more complex algorithms. 233 Thus, though
restoring the patent system to its status before Prometheus has some
initial appeal for driving the development of stable, well-defined
algorithms, other possibilities may better align incentives to drive
innovation forward.
2.

Regulatory Exclusivity

Regulatory exclusivity could provide incentives better tailored to
algorithms. Instead of relying on the patent system to provide the
incentive of excludability, in regulatory exclusivity a regulator restricts
competition by limiting the availability of pre-market approval to
competitors. 234 Thus, regulatory exclusivity requires the existence of a
L.J. 1025 (1990); Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and
Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191 (2008). But see Martin Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez,
A Technical Critique of Fifty Software Patents, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249 (2005)
(finding the most frequently cited software patents worth protection).
231 Merely restoring patent law incentives for black-box medicine might also result in
problems for black-box medicine itself. Although this Article begins with the position that
Prometheus and Myriad problematically reduced the patent incentives available for black-box
medicine, see discussion supra Section II.A.2, those initial incentives had flaws as well. In
particular, since black-box medicine resembles software in many ways, we might expect to see
some of the same problems that infect patents in the software industry, including frequent
issuance of patents on obsolete technologies, a mismatch between patent claims and actually
invented subject matter, broad and vague claim language, and substantial transaction costs. See,
e.g., Chien, supra note 230; Mark A. Lemley, Address, Software Patents and the Return of
Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013); Thomas, supra note 230.
232 The scholarly debate on these issues is extensive and need not be recapped here. See
Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011). For a discussion of the
relevant knowledge/embodiment distinction in patent law, see Kevin Emerson Collins, The
Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1279 (2014).
233 For an analogous situation, see, for example, W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in
Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 526–
27 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Making Do in Making Drugs] (describing the difficulties secrecy
creates in enforcing manufacturing process patents).
234 See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 71; Yaniv Heled,
Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015). “Exclusivity,” though widely used,
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premarket approval regime. In multiple contexts where such
preapproval requirements exist, some form of regulatory exclusivity is
used as an innovation incentive; 235 in others, it has been proposed.236
FDA administers the majority of extant applications of regulatory
exclusivity, primarily around the marketing of small-molecule drugs
and biologics. 237
Assuming the existence of a preapproval regime, regulatory
exclusivity could function the same way for black-box medicine
predictive models as for other innovations within preapproval regimes.
For example, in the context of drugs, FDA will not approve a generic
drug within five years of the approval of a drug based on a new chemical
entity. 238 For biologics, the period is twelve years. 239 Similarly, if FDA
approval were required for black-box medicine models to be
commercially marketed and used, FDA could withhold that approval
from imitator products for a fixed period of time as a reward to the
innovator company.
The main advantages for regulatory exclusivity are flexibility, ease
of enforcement, and strong disclosure. Regulatory exclusivity is more
flexible than the patent system. It is administered by an expert agency
with experience in the specific technology and—ideally—an innovation
mandate as well as a regulatory health and safety mandate. 240 Even
without substantial changes to the statutory contours of exclusivity, the
agency can apply it flexibly. Statutory changes are also easier because
regulatory exclusivity is not bound by the same treaty requirements as

is somewhat inaccurate because competitors are not excluded from the market; instead, a faster,
cheaper path to market—whether biosimilar approval or an Abbreviated New Drug
Application—is foreclosed for some period, effectively sharply increasing the costs of approval
and practically limiting market entry. Id. at 318–19. Heled proposes the more general term
“regulatory competitive shelter” to describe this phenomenon, id., but I will continue to use
“regulatory exclusivity,” largely for simplicity’s sake. To the extent that regulatory competitive
shelters could take on more shades than pure exclusivity—for instance, purely higher costs to
market entry, in the nature of regulator enforced mandatory license fees—the broader
phenomenon might more appropriately describe alternate solutions.
235 See Heled, supra note 234 (describing regulatory exclusivity regimes for drug, biologic,
and pesticide development).
236 See Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 233 (proposing regulatory exclusivity
for drug manufacturing innovations to promote such innovation).
237 Heled, supra note 234 (listing fourteen such regimes, of which thirteen are administered
by FDA and one by the Environmental Protection Agency).
238 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012) (granting five years of market exclusivity for new
chemical entities).
239 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) (2012) (granting four years of market exclusivity and an
additional eight years of data exclusivity to biologics).
240 Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 71.
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patent law; it can be flexible across products and across industrial
sectors in a way that patent law cannot. 241
The second advantage is that regulatory exclusivity is substantially
easier to enforce than patents, with consequently more uniform
enforcement. The default of a market preapproval regime is the inability
to enter the market; thus, if regulatory exclusivity exists for a particular
well-defined product, competitors can be prevented from entering that
market simply by denying approval for the competitors’ products for the
appropriate period of time. 242 This contrasts with the difficulty and
expense of enforcing patents. 243
The third and final advantage to regulatory exclusivity comes only
if exclusivity is coupled with a disclosure requirement. In the context of
drug development, regulatory exclusivity demands the production of
knowledge (that a drug is safe and effective, as measured by clinical
trials), and requires at least some disclosure of that knowledge. 244
Although clinical trial data are not fully disclosed now, 245 the basic
results of trials—that a particular drug is safe and effective for a
particular indication—become public and can eventually be relied upon

241 The treaty on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), to which the
United States is a party, requires that patent systems be relatively uniform across different
countries. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. For the purposes of this Article, the most important requirement of
TRIPS is that patent terms cannot be technology-specific. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in
Innovation Policy, supra note 71, at 365 (suggesting that regulatory exclusivity may help tailor
innovation policy without violating TRIPS). Note, however, that countries may choose to
disallow the patentability of medical techniques, as Europe has largely done, and as the United
States has effectively done. See EPC art. 52(2), supra note 130; see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
(2012). Black-box medicine and algorithmic medicine in general could potentially be excluded
from patentability, but probably not given an intermediate or differently structured set of
incentives from other technological areas.
242 On the other hand, the definition of a “product” might be particularly flexible in the
context of black-box medicine; fluid boundaries would raise some of the same enforcement
challenges that exist in patent law.
243 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY: 2011
(noting that, for patent infringement claims under $1 million, median legal costs are $650,000;
for claims from $1 million to $25 million, costs are $2.5 million; for claims over $25 million,
median costs are $5 million).
244 See Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, supra note 71, at 366–72.
245 A rapidly growing movement focuses on the disclosure of clinical trial data. See Kamran
Abbasi, Compulsory Registration of Clinical Trials, 329 BMJ 637 (2004); Richard Lehman &
Elizabeth Loder, Missing Clinical Trial Data, 344 BMJ d8158 (2012); Michelle M. Mello et al.,
Preparing for Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1651 (2013).
However, these disclosures are not tied to FDA approval. Arguments have long been made that
information submitted for regulatory approval should be disclosed, see Thomas O. McGarity &
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming
Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1980), but those arguments have not
succeeded.
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by generic companies to secure approval. 246 In general, since the
regulator who approves the product is the same entity that enforces
regulatory exclusivity, innovators have an incentive to be forthcoming
and candid in their disclosures, rather than facing the incentive to
obscure useful technical information in patents to minimize disclosure
to competitors. 247
The principal challenge with implementing regulatory exclusivity is
that it relies on a market-spanning regulatory preapproval regime,
which does not currently exist for data-driven diagnostic tests. 248 A full
analysis of FDA’s diagnostic test regime and what is most appropriate
for black-box medicine must await future work. In brief, however, while
FDA does currently regulate some diagnostic tests, many exist outside
its current scope, and there is certainly not a comprehensive regime in
place. 249 Were such a regime implemented, regulatory exclusivity would
be an attractive possibility. Nevertheless, the possibility of regulatory
exclusivity as an innovation incentive is probably not sufficient
justification to impose a premarket approval regime if one would
otherwise not be warranted.
Other problems with regulatory exclusivity are inherent in the
name and the concept: it, like the patent system, focuses on exclusivity.
To the extent that black-box medicine models rely on underlying
natural laws, excluding others from using those laws presents the same
preemption problems that the Supreme Court named as problematic for
innovation in Prometheus. 250 Additionally—and problematically—
applying regulatory exclusivity relies on defining the contours of a
specific model. When models are multifaceted, complex, and implicit,
defining the contours of a model and knowing whether another model
overlaps with those contours may be an insurmountable hurdle. 251

246 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2012) (allowing generic drug applicants to rely on the finding of
safety and efficacy of the pioneer drug).
247 See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 942–44 (2011)
(citing Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 560–62 (2009), and Benjamin
N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L.
REV. 2007, 2025 (2005)).
248 FDA does regulate diagnostic testing kits and companion diagnostics, but does not
regulate testing services provided by individual laboratories. Steven Gutman, The Role of Food
and Drug Administration Regulation of in Vitro Diagnostic Devices—Applications to Genetics
Testing, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 746 (1999).
249 See id.
250 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
251 Although black-box models may be static and stable, at least initially, complex big-data
models in medicine may eventually be flexibly updated. This plasticity would make exclusivity
mechanisms, whether regulatory or patent-based, less useful by further complicating the
definition of a product.
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Prizes

A third possibility to enhance innovation in algorithms is reliance
on prizes or grants as a reward for innovation. 252 Grants and prizes each
typically rely on the award of money—typically a fixed sum—to solve a
defined problem. Under a grant regime, firms compete for monetary
incentives that are then to be used to develop an innovation. 253 Under a
prize regime, a monetary prize is offered to whichever firm can develop
a solution to a defined problem. 254 Typically, the prize amount is fixed,
though it need not be. 255 Such devices can avoid the requirement of
exclusivity, either in situations where it is unavailable (e.g., when the
innovation is unpatentable) or where free distribution is mandated as
part of the incentive regime (e.g., where entering a prize competition or
winning a grant requires relinquishing patent rights and committing to
disclosure).
Prize and grant systems both require knowing the approximate
contours of a defined problem with a defined solution and knowing the
rough value of a solution to the problem. 256 Since personalized medicine
in general and black-box medicine in particular are broad endeavors
with significant implicit knowledge, clearly defining the problems and
solutions appears particularly difficult. Goals could be defined very
generally; for instance, any algorithm that decreases costs while
252 An extensive literature examines prizes and grants as alternatives to patents. See
Abramowicz, supra note 181; Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging
Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998); Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards
Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001) (arguing for the superiority of an
optional prize system); Joseph Stiglitz, supra note 181; Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace
Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25
(2007). But see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (arguing against prizes). For an overview of grants and
prizes that places them in a taxonomy with patents and tax incentives, and argues that all four
can set economic incentives that should be at base indistinguishable to rational firms, see
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 181, at 310–13. For an argument that patents and prizes, at least
as applied, are largely indistinguishable, see Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes, supra note
181. Roin also offers an extensive bibliography. Id. at 3–5. This literature has typically not
included regulatory exclusivity among the menu of options, perhaps because its exclusivity
model parallels that of patents; to the extent that regulatory exclusivity has benefits over patents
for certain fields of technological innovation, it may obviate certain criticisms that lead at least
some scholars to prefer prizes.
253 See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 181, at 320–21.
254 See id. at 317–19.
255 For instance, instead of a fixed sum of money, a prize could be defined as a fraction of
identifiable government savings attributable to the innovation. Cf. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is it the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL’Y &
ECON. 51, 54 (2002) (arguing that prizes should be tied to social value); Earl L. Grinols & James
W. Henderson, Replace Pharmaceutical Patents Now, 25 PHARMACOECONOMICS 355, 356
(2007) (proposing drug prizes tied to sales).
256 See Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes, supra note 181, at 1026–29.
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maintaining or increasing health measures. Such very broad (and very
valuable) algorithms might be the most useful, but might also have the
hardest time overcoming the competitive incentives of private parties to
keep the algorithms secret. Goals could also be defined more narrowly;
for instance, any algorithm that decreases the frequency of adverse
reactions to taking a drug with a narrow therapeutic index by ten
percent.
But the challenge of determining the optimal incentive size
remains. The advantage of patents and other exclusivity regimes is
that—at least ideally—the size of the reward should track the social
value of the innovation. 257 Firms can use market information to project
that value and invest accordingly. For prizes, whoever sets the prize—
typically the government—usually must determine the eventual social
value in advance; however, governments are typically not well-suited to
this task. 258 Potentially, this problem could also be solved by basing the
reward not on a specific dollar amount, but rather on a fraction of
savings to government health programs like Medicare or Medicaid. This
would increase proportionately with social value without requiring preestimation of the eventual size of the reward. However, many medically
valuable uses are not particularly economical; for example, keeping a
patient alive may lead to more costs in the future. Finally, prizes face
considerable political economy problems; though many medical prizes
have been proposed, implementation follows far behind.
Overall, although the specifics of implementation will require
considerable care, prizes appear to be an attractive alternative to more
traditional exclusivity incentives for the development of black-box
medicine models. Achieving the right level of specificity and project
definition is challenging, but that challenge also arises with patents and
regulatory exclusivity regimes. Moreover, prizes can be precisely
tailored and can be structured to require disclosure so as to enable
continued cumulative innovation.

257 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580
(2003).
258 Grants face the same type of problem, though the grant-making organization must
accurately estimate the cost of the innovation rather than the social value. Grants have other
advantages: they are frequently used in biomedical research to incentivize innovation, and are,
therefore, familiar; they leverage a social discount rate which is typically lower than private
discount rates; and they avoid capital constraints and risk aversion. See Hemel & Ouellette,
supra note 181, at 308. However, like prizes, they do not increase with the size of the eventual
social welfare gain of the innovation, and therefore, face additional steps in guiding the
allocation of innovative effort among projects.
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Incentives for Validation

Finally, incentives are needed for model validation. 259 Unlike both
traditional medical development and explicit personalized medicine,
black-box medicine cannot readily be validated in standard,
straightforward ways. However, black-box medicine still needs
validation to ensure reliability. Instead of scientific understanding,
clinical trials, and postmarket surveillance, the validation of complex,
implicit black-box medicine models require validation through other
computational mechanisms. Developing methods for that validation,
and ensuring they are consistently applied, is an important piece of the
innovation policy picture.
Innovation policy should ensure that appropriate incentives exist
to drive validation. A bounty could be implemented for external
validation (with standards likely set by FDA). Bounties could be set as a
small fraction of the overall revenues of the model—as part of the initial
regulatory exclusivity bargain, if one exists—paid by the original
developer. The size of the reward would then roughly increase with the
overall value of the model. 260 Rewards for confirmatory validation
would ideally decrease asymptotically, so that initial validation would be
much more valuable than further confirmation, but that any
confirmation over a particular validity threshold received at least some
reward. This could be set to ensure that the overall fraction of originator
revenue that could be siphoned to incentivize validation would be
capped. 261 On the contrary side, rewards for finding problems should
also exist, and should likely not decrease with repetition. 262
As an additional factor, concerns about validation are exacerbated
when data and models are kept secret and proprietary. Implicit models
are difficult to validate for the reasons described above, more difficult
without access to the modeling code, and extremely difficult without
access to the data on which the model was based. Thus, ensuring
See supra Section II.B.3.
One challenge is that focusing on monetary goals, whether revenue-based or savingsbased, might focus incentives on models which deal primarily with costs rather than health
improvements. If the principal goal of black-box medicine is cost-reduction, this focus would
be unproblematic. However, if—as seems likely—improving health outcomes is either a
primary objective of black-box medicine or at least an important ancillary objective, then an
alternate path to valuing validation would be needed, or some combination of monetary savings
and health outcomes.
261 For instance, for a validation cap of two percent, the first validator to pass a certain
threshold could receive one percent, and then each subsequent validator could receive half the
amount of the previous validator; the sum of these fractions converges to two percent.
262 The incentives available for challenges to models might be expected to decrease naturally;
if a model is called into question, its value presumably decreases and any fixed fraction of that
value would also decrease.
259
260

PRICE.37.4.6 (Do Not Delete)

1452

4/3/2016 1:49 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1401

disclosure is important to enable not only development and cumulative
innovation, but also validation of existing models.
Overall, the appropriate balance of innovation incentives for the
development of black-box medicine requires significant and detailed
further work. However, an optimal final landscape might include some
push to assemble useful information, either via a public or publicprivate enterprise, tailored prizes to help drive algorithm development,
and bounties for the purposes of third-party validation. In the latter two
categories, the prosaic solution of increased grant funding for academic
model development may also provide a significant boost in an area
where the incentive needs are significant but not excessively large.
CONCLUSION
Overall, black-box medicine offers immense promise for changing
the way medicine is practiced and the way medical technologies are
created and deployed. However, the growth of black-box medicine
requires an active and effective innovation policy. The current
intellectual landscape in the United States creates problematic incentives
that encourage firms to keep data secret and to focus on simple drugdevice linkages, rather than developing the necessary capabilities to
develop black-box medicine. This Article has suggested a few ways to
change that innovation policy on the path to the major economic and
health benefits of the next step in personalized medicine.
More generally, this Article stands along previous work to suggest
that our broad-brush innovation system has problematic implications
on the ground as it is applied to different questions of innovation in
different industries. 263 The pharmaceutical and biomedical industries
are typically characterized as areas where patents work fairly well; other
industries, like software, are characterized as areas where patents work
much less well to drive innovation. 264 This Article argues for greater
263 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2004) (defending industry-neutrality of patent laws); Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002); Michael W.
Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L.
REV. 845 (2006); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); William Fisher III, The
Disaggregation of Intellectual Property, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 2004, at 24 (arguing for more
industry-specific patent laws); Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, FED. LAW., Feb. 2008,
at 44 (defending industry-neutrality of patent laws); Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming
the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487 (2007) (arguing for more
industry-specific patent laws); Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 233.
264 See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI.
173 (1986) (reporting different rates of patent importance in different industries); Wesley M.
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nuance and granularity even within industries. Drug manufacturing
responds differently to patent and regulatory incentives than drug
discovery and development, 265 development of new uses responds
differently than developing initial uses, 266 and, as I have argued here,
simple diagnostic tests respond differently to patent incentives than
complex implicit algorithms. Setting incentives right, and directing
innovation policy accordingly, is key to moving forward toward the
future of medicine.

Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (same).
265 Price, Making Do in Making Drugs, supra note 233.
266 Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses, supra note 13.

